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Article 3

ARBITRATING, WAIVING AND DEFERRING TITLE
VII CLAIMS
Stephen A. Plass*
INTRODUCTION

In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the United
States Supreme Court ruled that an employee who wished to
avoid arbitrating his Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)2 claim must show, among other things, congressional intent to preclude waiver of his rights to a judicial forum.' The
Gilmer Court was asked whether an employee's agreement in a
securities registration application to arbitrate all claims arising
in the employment context must be honored when the employee
contends that he was discharged in violation of the ADEA. Finding no congressional preclusion to waiver and citing numerous
factors that support arbitration, the Court determined that the
employee must honor his agreement to arbitrate.
Like the ADEA, title V11 does not contain a provision that
precludes waiver of rights. Instead of preclusion language, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,8 which amends title VII, contains language that encourages arbitration.7 As a result, the new Civil
Rights Act may well be interpreted by judges as a signal from
Congress to accommodate and defer to arbitral resolution of title
VII disputes on a broad scale. The Court's latest pronouncements of support for arbitrating statutory issues in Gilmer sug* Associate Professor, School of Law, St. Thomas University; LL.M., Georgetown

University;, J.D., Howard University;, B.A. Fairleigh Dickinson University. The author
thanks Louis Aronin and Marion Crain for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
1 1 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Supp. 1986).
Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
'Id. at 1657.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
6 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
Id. § 118. This statute provides in relevant part: "Where appropriate and to the

extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including..
. arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of
Federal law amended by this Act." Id.
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gest a likely judicial shift from restraint to deference when ruling on agreements to arbitrate title VII disputes.
Emerging judicial and statutory support for arbitrating discrimination claims must be balanced against evidence that Congress regards judicial relief as the primary or most effective
method for addressing discrimination disputes. For instance,
while containing some "pro-arbitration" language, the 1991 Civil
Rights Act also highlights the importance of statutory protection
for individuals who now have expanded rights and remedies, including the right to jury trials. Thus the 1991 Act also can be
interpreted as restraining legislation on the Court, which is apparently committed eventually to making all claims arbitrable.
Nevertheless, the Act's encouragement of arbitration leaves
enough interpretive room for the Court to continue down its
pro-arbitration track.
Over the years, neither litigation nor arbitration has proven
to be a panacea for workplace discrimination ills. The 1991 Act
is also not a cure. Although the new Act restored and expanded
employment antidiscrimination laws,8 litigation remains an ex- The

statute's purpose provisions specifically codify the concepts of "business ne-

cessity" and "job relatedness," enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and in other Supreme Court decisions before Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071. The statute
provides in section 107 that an employer violates title VII whenever a prohibited consid.

eration was a motivating factor in its decisions toughening the "same decision" test announced by the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 105 Stat. at
1075. Section 112 of the Act broadens the Court's interpretation in Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), of the statute of limitations provision in section
706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires that a charge be filed within 180 or
300 days of the adoption of the alleged wrongful practice. 105 Stat. at 1079.
The Act in sections 3(2) and 105 also provides statutory recognition of disparate
impact claims and restores the proof standard outlined in Griggs. 105 Stat. at 1071,
1074-75. These provisions work a partial reversal of Wards Cove, which also lowered the
employer's burden of proof in disparate impact suits. The Act's sections 101(c) and 107
confirm the application of section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to private and post-hiring dis.
crimination. These sections resolve questions raised in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), about section 1981's scope, and reject the Pattersonholding
that section 1981 does not prohibit on-the-job discrimination. Section 108 of the Act
limits the circumstances under which consent decrees may be challenged, thereby narrowing the scope of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), which held that reverse discrimination plaintiffs may collaterally attack consent decrees if they were not joined in
the litigation. 105 Stat. 1076-77. Section 109 provides for extraterritorial application of
title VII, thereby reversing EEOC v. Arab Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). 105 Stat.
1079. Section 113(b) of the Act amends 706(k) of title VII to allow the recovery of expert
fees as part of attorney's fees, thereby rejecting the Court's holding in West Virginia
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pensive, stressful and time-consuming remedial path. The governing rules for title VII litigation still impose tough proof requirements on plaintiffs;' and the unavailability of evidence of
illegal motive reduces the likelihood that wrongful conduct will
be challenged or proven. These realities make arbitration of title
VII claims worthy of serious consideration by employees because
their chances of recovery decrease with tough statutory proof requirements. At the same time, arbitration is generally affordable, efficient, flexible and tailored to the needs of the work environment. The parties are able to pick their judge and define the
governing rules and the parameters of relief. Although in the
collective bargaining context unions "own" the grievance and
their limited duty of fair representation may be inadequate to
advance the interests of workers, arbitration's long recognized
benefits to employers and employees compel an analysis of the
suitability of arbitral forums for resolving discrimination
disputes.10
This Article will look at Gilmer in the context of collective
bargaining contracts and evaluate the possible implications of
arbitrating title VII disputes for employees, labor unions and
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"). To
show the potential impact of Gilmer on groups protected by title
VII, the experience of racial minorities will be used as illustrations. Part I generally examines the historical development of
labor arbitration of statutory rights. Its primary focus will be on
the ability of employees and unions to waive title VII rights and
the policy concerns implicated. It critiques the Court's latest
pronouncements in Gilmer and notes that, in spite of statutory

Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). The Act also expands title VII by providing
for compensatory damages in section 102; punitive damages in special circumstances (§
102(b)); and jury trials (§ 102(c)). In section 117, the Act provides coverage of the House
of Representatives and congressional instrumentalities. In effect, section 117 covers Senate employees and presidential appointees not subject to Senate confirmation but allors
House employees to utilize internal House rules.
Proof of intent is still a dominant feature of employment antidiscrimination laws
and establishing an employer's motive is a rather difficult proposition for plaintiffs. Further, although under the 1991 Act plaintiffs can rely on statistics in impact cases, each
alleged wrongful practice must also be identified, except in cases where the elements of
an employer's discriminatory process are inseparable. Id. § 105(b)(i).
10 In this Article the word discrimination refers to conduct prohibited by title VII
and should not be confused with discrimination prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152-169 (1982).
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emphasis on judicial protection, the Court is moving toward
finding title VII rights waivable under particular circumstances.
Part II focuses on the responsibilities that would inure to
unions in this shift from judicial protection to judicial deference
with respect to waiver of title VII rights. It begins by considering the track record of unions in the area of employment discrinination before title VII. It then looks at the performance of
unions under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and
title VII to project their future performance and to determine
what role unions should play as no-waiver assumptions erode.
The competing considerations that unions must generally weigh
when faced with incidents or allegations of discrimination in the
workplace is also considered. The analysis is mindful that declining union membership and strength1 1 make majority choices
that compete with equal employment goals of minority groups
paramount on the agenda of unions. 12 This Part also examines
Gilmer's potential impact on the Board's deferral policies.
Part III proposes increasing involvement for arbitrators, la-

bor unions and the Board in title VII matters. Specifically, the
flexibility of arbitration to give equitable relief in spite of the
law is noted. Further, the potential for arbitration and Board
resolution to promote industrial peace is emphasized and balanced against the proven benefits and drawbacks of litigation.
Finally, the potential of unions and the Board to be vital and

21 Unions have experienced a dramatic decline in membership over the past 50
years.
Union members accounted for 16.1 percent of employed wage and salary workers in 1991, the same proportion as in 1990. Prior to this leveling off, there had
been a 3-decade long slide in union membership as a percentage of employment; however, in 1991, both employment and union membership declined
proportionately.
United States Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Release No. 92-61 (Feb. 10,
1992) [hereinafter Release]. See also Marion G. Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV.
953, 953 n.3 (1990) (documenting dramatic decline in union membership and attributing
decline partly to the law's inability to adapt to economic changes); Paul C. Weiler,
PromisesTo Keep: Securing Workers' Right To Self Organization Under The NLRA, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983) (tracking the decline of union density from 1935 to 1980 and
partly attributing the drop in membership to the representation process of the NLRA).
"2Although current statistics show black males joining unions in proportionally
higher numbers than any other group, whites still constitute the greater bulk of union
membership and support. See Release, supra note 11. As a result, unions must cater to
"majority" interests that are often at odds with protected minority priorities, particularly on issues such as affirmative action.
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effective players in this area is considered.
I. ARBrIRATI G TrrLE VII CLAIMS
A.

Tensions in National Policy
Whether arbitration is a suitable or preferable mode for

handling title VII disputes has to be considered within the context of national labor policies. On the one hand, national labor
policy under the NLRA favors majority rule and collectivity that

is facilitated by "contractual" grievance arbitration, evidenced

by the collective bargaining agreement. 13 At the same time, title

VII advances the "statutory" right of individuals to proceed personally with a claim in spite of the presence and advocacy of a

collective bargaining representative. 1 ' Although the same conduct may at times violate both statutes, the enactment of title
VII did not oust the Board of jurisdiction. Employees thereby
have potentially duplicating relief options. 15
The statutory right to individual protection from discrimination has been judicially guarded and was recently reaffirmed
with the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.21 Contemporaneously, however, a conservative Supreme Court has been deemphasizing statutory preeminence and deferring to agreements

waiving statutory rights.17 The Bush Administration had advocated a bigger role for arbitration in resolving title VII matters.""

13Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) ("The collective bargaining system as encouraged by congress and administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in a bargaining unit.").
14Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
15Id. at 50. The Court further found the doctrines of election of remedies and
waiver inapplicable in this context. Id. at 49-51.
" Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
17See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
18The Bush Administration advocated a larger role for the arbitration/private contract forum as part of its civil rights bill. See HR. 1375, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
The Administration's bill provided. "Where knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the
parties, reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution, including binding arbitration,
shall be encouraged in place of the judicial resolution of disputes arising under this Act
and the Act amended by this Act." Id. § 12. Senator Dole echoed the President's sentiments by offering the same interpretation for section 1745, the compromise bill that
passed the Senate and went on to become the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 137 Cong.
Rec. §§ 15472-01, 15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991). Senator Dole noted: "In light of the
litigation crisis facing this country and the increasing sophistication and reliability of
alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums. See Gil-

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 779

And whether President Clinton has a different view or will have
an opportunity to impact this area is an open question. As a result, the tension between statutory guarantees and individual
freedom of contract retains vitality. Equally entrenched, however, is a recent line of Court decisions, which places personal
contractual choices over statutory mandates and emphasizes the
effectiveness of arbitration in advancing statutory policies. 19
This renewed confidence in arbitration diminishes the prospect
that title VII will remain a "unique" federal right and puts arbitrators in a powerful position to help shape work environments.
B.

The Erratic Gains of Arbitration

Over the years arbitration has proven itself to be a reliable
and effective vehicle for resolving industrial disputes. 20 After a
slow start,21 labor arbitration gained judicial recognition and
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991)." Id.
19See, e.g., Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657; Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 109
S. Ct. 1917 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsub.
ishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
20 For a helpful discussion of the benefits of arbitration over litigation and its propensity to promote industrial peace, see FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ABITRATEON WORKS 4-9 (4th ed. 1988).
21 Even at the turn of this century courts were still not recognizing agreements to
arbitrate labor disputes. See U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). In 1925 Congress finally acted with the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988), but this legislation excluded contracts of employment from its coverage. Id.§ 1. For a discussion of the Act's legislative
history, its commercial focus and the role of labor organizations in shaping it, see Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 32 ViLL. L. REV. 57, 69-73 (1987). This left the door open for divergent interpretations by courts as to whether the Act applied to collective bargaining agreements. See
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Justice Frankfurter suggests that the Court implicitly rejected FAA's application to collective bargaining agreements by refusing to address the Act in its decision.). In 1935 the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1988), was enacted. It also
did not provide for judicial recognition of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes. Finally,
in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1984),
there was explicit recognition of parties' agreement to arbitrate. Section 203(d), 29
U.S.C. § 173(d), of the LMRA provides in part: "Final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for the settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collectivebargaining agreement ....
." Id.In addition, section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §
185, provides that United States district courts have jurisdiction to resolve labor contract
disputes. This provision was first interpreted by the Court in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). In Westinghouse a union brought suit under section 301 contending that the employer violated the
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backing in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills.2 2 The years immediately following Lincoln Mills saw unprecedented judicial rec-

ognition, support and deference to the arbitral process.23 Even

collective bargaining agreement by failing to pay wages due individual employees. The
union asked the Court to interpret the contract and declare the rights of the parties. The
Court declined to assert jurisdiction, ruling that the provision's legislative history did not
support a conclusion that Congress conferred on federal courts jurisdiction over such
suits. Id. at 461. The Court concluded that an assertion of jurisdiction would pose constitutional difficulties and flood federal courts with what were historically state court
claims. Id. at 459-60.
- 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills the Court took a second look at section 301
of the LMRA and concluded that this provision gave federal courts jurisdiction and
more. In Lincoln Mills a union sued to compel arbitration of a dispute arising under a
collective bargaining agreement that had no-strike and grievance arbitration clauses. The
Court ruled that the parties must arbitrate. The Court held that the agreement to arbitrate was the quid pro quo for the agreement not to strike and that section 301 does
more than confer jurisdiction on federal courts. The Court found that section 301 evidenced a federal policy that federal courts be involved in enforcing labor agreements to
promote industrial peace. Id. at 455. The Court further declared that section 301 also
gave federal courts authority to fashion a body of law to govern labor disputes in which
acceptable existing state law would be absorbed as federal law. Id. at 457. In reaching
these conclusions the Court dispensed with federalist constitutional concerns noted in
Westinghouse and was undeterred by the statute's cloudy and confusing legislative history. Id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting.) The Court also omitted from its decision
any analysis or response to the ruling of the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit held that a
collective baragaining agreement is a contract of employment as contemplated by the
FAA and is therefore exempted from FAA coverage. 230 F.2d 81, 86 (1956), afl'd, 353
U.S. 448. See also Ray, supra note 21, at 62, 69.
"Three years after the Lincoln Mills decision, the Court handed down three proarbitration decisions commonly referred to as the "Steelworkers Trilogy." These decisions are United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960). The American Mfg. case was a
LMRA section 301 suit to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement
that had a broad arbitration clause. The agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the contract provisions. The
district court held that the employee's claim was estopped by a workers' compensation
settlement agreement, while the court of appeals concluded that the claim was "frivolous, patently baseless, not subject to arbitration." See 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 363 US. 564 (1960). In reversing, the Supreme Court ruled that once the parties
agreed to submit all contract interpretation questions to the arbitrator, courts have no
business weighing the merits of a particular grievance. Courts are confined to determining whether the claim, on its face, is governed by the collective bargaining agreement.
363 U.S. at 568. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974)
(reaffirming the presumption of arbitrability); Nolde Bros. v. Bakery and Confectionary
Workers, 430 U.S. 243 (1977) (extending the presumption of arbitrability to dispute3
arising under a contract but after that contract's expiration). In Warrior Gulf, the secthe suit holding
ond steelworkers' suit to compel arbitration, the district court d
that the conduct, contracting out work, was a right reserved to management and that the
contract did not give the arbitrator authority to review the employer's business judg-
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act 24 had to give way to the national pol-

icy favoring peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through
arbitration.2 5 In addition, the public policy exception 2 to the en-

forcement of arbitral awards was narrowly construed to promote
deference to arbitral forums.27
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,28 however, the Court began to delineate the limits of arbitration. The Gardner-Denver

ment. 168 F. Supp. 702, 705 (S.D. Ala. 1958), afl'd, 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd,
363 U.S. 564, 574 (1960). The Supreme Court held that: "An order to arbitrate a particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 581-83. The Court further noted
that the grievance arbitration clause will cover all disputes unless specifically excluded
by the parties, that the arbitrator performs functions foreign to the competence of
courts, and that arbitration is governed by industrial common law, which is an intrinsic
part of the collective bargaining agreement, although not specifically provided for in it.
Id. The third cage, Enterprise Wheel, was also a suit to enforce the contract's arbitration
clause. In Enterprise Wheel, the district court ordered arbitration, but the contract expired before the rendering of an award. 168 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. W. Va. 1958), reu'd, 269
F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The employer contended to no avail
that expiration of the contract prohibited the arbitrator from reinstating employees. In
overturning the arbitrator's decision, the court of appeals ruled that an award of reinstatement and back pay subsequent to the expiration of the contract was unenforceable
since the contract had expired, and remanded to require the parties to complete the
arbitration. 269 F.2d at 331-32. In addition, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the arbitrator's award was mathematically indefinite. Id. For the third time, the Court reversed.
363 U.S. 593 (1960). It ruled that as long as the arbitration award draws its essence from
the contract, ambiguities which suggest that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his
authority would not provide the basis for refusing enforcement. The Court added that
the federal policy favoring arbitration would be undermined if courts overruled arbitrators when judges' construction of contracts differed from that of arbitrators. Id. at 59699. See also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 764-66 (1983) (reaffirming that ambiguity is not a basis for overturning an
award as long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement).
24 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1988). Originally enacted in 1932, this legislation is commonly
referred to as the "anti-injunction statute."
25 See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970),
overruling Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). In Sinclairthe Court held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited injunctive relief against a union striking in
violation of the collective bargaining contract, and rejected the employer's requests for
arbitration under the contract. Id. at 203. In Boys Markets, however, the Court determined that Sinclair frustrated the national policy which had shifted from protecting
unions to advocacy of peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through arbitration. 398
U.S. at 241. See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962) (state
courts have jurisdiction over a suit for violation of the collective bargaining agreement's
no strike clause to promote peaceful resolution through arbitration).
20 See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
2 See Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
28 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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Court faced the specific issue of whether the arbitral forum was
suitable for resolving title VII claims. 2 The Court concluded
that it was not, determining that an arbitrator's special competence does not extend to unique federal rights.30 Moreover, the
arbitral forum was found inadequate due to its informality, deficient fact finding capabilities and incomplete recordkeeping.31
Yet the Court found that under clearly defined circumstances,
an arbitrator's ' award
dealing with title VII issues could be given
"great weight. 32
The view that federal rights are preeminent is not limited to
title VII matters. The Court took a similar posture in a case
arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 3 In Barrentine v.
Arkansas Best Freight Sys. Inc.34 the Court ruled that arbitral
29 Id. In Gardner-Denveran employee was discharged and filed a grievance that did
not include a claim of racial discrimination. However, before arbitration a racial discrimination claim was added. The arbitrator rejected the racial discrimination claim and
ruled that the employee was fired for cause. The employee had also filed a claim with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "EEOC." The EEOC ruled that there was
no reasonable ground to believe that the employee was discriminated against. The employee then filed suit in district court. 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
30 Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 56.
Si Id. at 56-57. The Court specifically noted that an employee does not waive his
title VII rights by resorting to the arbitral forum and the arbitrator's expertise and authority is in the area of contract rights. Therefore the arbitrator must resolve issues on
the basis of the contract, even if it conflicts with title VIL Id.
Id. at 60 n.21. In this notable footnote the Court wroteWe adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision,
since this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to facts and
circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement that conform substantially to Title VII,
the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record
with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to
an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight.
This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record.
Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1988).
34 450 U.S. 728 (1981). This suit arose because of the contention of certain truck
drivers that pre-trip work time was compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). When the company rejected this claim under the grievance provision of the
collective bargaining agreement, the employees filed suit. Id. at 731. The lower courts
addressed and rejected only a fair representation claim and avoided the FLSA claim on
grounds that its submission to arbitration barred its assertion in court. 615 F.2d 1194
(8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 728 (1981). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
exhaustion of the grievance procedure did not bar the FLSA claim since these statutory
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procedures were not as protective of individual statutory rights

as judicial procedures.3 5 The same conclusion was reached in a
section 198336 case where the Court held that arbitrators lacked

the expertise to resolve complex legal questions.

The Court

again remarked that the arbitral process was unsuitable for
resolving issues arising under federal statutory and constitutional laws38 and reaffirmed that judicial 39procedures and substance must be used to resolve such suits.
Despite Gardner-Denver's pronouncements, parties have
40
been increasingly willing to arbitrate their title VII disputes.
This willingness has been reinforced by the limited number of
awards being overturned. 4' Further, on the heels of Gardner-

Denver, the American Arbitration Association revised its rules

to provide for greater procedural protection in this area. 42 Arbitrators have also grown more comfortable with ruling on title
VII matters, relying on specific grants of power by the parties
and general non-discrimination clauses as sources of authority.43

rights are independent of contractual rights and not waivable. Id. at 741-45.
450 U.S. at 737-38, citing Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 44.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

See McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984). In McDonald
a discharged police officer lost a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement
when an arbitrator found that he was discharged for cause. The officer then filed a section 1983 suit alleging that his discharge was in retaliation for exercising his constitu.
tional rights to free speech, freedom of association and freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances. Id. at 286. The officer prevailed at trial against the police
chief but the court of appeals reversed, ruling that the arbitral award operated as res.
judicata and collateral estoppel. 709 F.2d 1505 (1983). The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that arbitrators may not have the expertise to resolve the complex legal questions of section 1983 or the authority to enforce it. 466 U.S. at 288.
3' McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290. As it had done in Gardner-Denverand Barrentine,
the Court again noted that while arbitration is suitable for contract disputes, it is not
adequate to protect federal statutory and constitutional rights. Id. The Court added that
the arbitral process could not safeguard statutory rights since its processes are not
equivalent to that of the judiciary. Id. at 291. Further, principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel do not apply to an award in an arbitration proceeding brought under
a collective bargaining agreement since the arbitral forum is not judicial and federal
courts need not give full faith and credit to an award. Id. at 287-88.
37

39 Id.
40 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 20, at 9 ("With respect to title VII discrimination
claims, statistical studies show that a sizeable number of these claims are arbitrated and
that the number of cases processed by arbitrators is on the increase.").
41 Id. at 9 n.46.
42 See Robert Coulson, Fair Treatment: Voluntary Arbitration of Employee
Claims, 33 ARB. J. No. 3, 23 (1978).
43 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 20, at 382-83 nn. 43-52.
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C. Current Judicial Trends in ArbitratingStatutory Issues
The mid-1980s saw a great resurgence of Court confidence

in the suitability of arbitration for resolving statutory issues.
The old judicial hostility was replaced by equally forceful confi-

dence when the Court overruled Wilko v. Swan 4 and deter-

mined that securities claims were arbitrable.4 5 Even before this

determination, the Court had found Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") 4" and antitrust 47 claims
suitable for arbitration.

Lower courts, however, had split on whether to enforce private agreements to arbitrate other statutory rights. For example,
in Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l Inc.,48 Utley v.
Goldman Sachs and Co.49 and Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc.50 plaintiffs were not required to submit their discrimination
claims to arbitration before being given access to the courts.
Contemporaneously, in similar circumstances, other courts have

held that agreements to arbitrate must be honored."'
" 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989). In Wilko the Court refused to enforce a purchaser's securities
agreement to arbitrate, finding that section 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77,
which precluded waiver of compliance, took precedence over the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1947), which established the desirability of arbitration for
commercial transactions. Id. at 438. Besides deciding that this was the best reconciliation
of congressional intent vis-a-vis these two statutes, the Court pointed to deficiencies in
the arbitrator's knowledge of the law, inadequacy of the arbitral process and the arbitrator's inability to make factual determinations and evidentiary assessments. Id. at 435-38.
45 Rodriquez de Quijas et aL v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989). The Court noted that the old judicial hostility to arbitration had been eroding for
years in lower courts and suspicions about the quality of protection afforded by the arbitral forum had been overridden by the Court's strong endorsement of arbitration of federal statutory rights. Id. at 481.
46 Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). For the relevant RICO provisions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1990).
'4 Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). For the relevant Sherman Act provisions, see 15 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1914).
48 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989). See also Nordin v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 897 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.
1990) (denying employer's motion to compel arbitration despite broad arbitration clause
in settlement agreement).
49 883 F.2d 184 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990). See also
Bierdeman v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 744 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd,
963 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 1992 WL 228109.
- 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2050 (1991) (vacated and remanded in light of Gilmer).
"I See, e.g., Cook v. Barratt Am. Inc., 268 Cal. Rptr. 629, reh'g denied and opinion
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The Supreme Court addressed this split in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.5 2 In Gilmer the employee argued
that: (1) he could not waive his statutory rights; 53 (2) public policy supported judicial resolution of his claim;" 4 (3) the arbitration forum was inadequate; 5 and (4) the arbitration agreement
was the product of his unequal bargaining power with his employer.5 6 The Court rejected each argument, noting that the employee, Gilmer, had failed to show congressional intent to preclude waiver.57 Additionally, the Court noted that the public
policy evidenced by the statute can be vindicated through arbitration, 8 that suspicions about the inadequacy of arbitration
have already been rejected, 5 and that unequal bargaining in the
employment context does not make an agreement unenforceable,
except on such grounds as are available to revoke contracts
generally. 0
The Court then distinguished Gilmer's case from GardnerDenver and its progeny, reasoning that the employee in Gardner-Denver did not choose to limit his rights by agreeing to arbi-

modified (May 21, 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 (1991); Mago v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
52 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
'3 The waiver argument was successful in Gardner-Denver, an employment case
that Gilmer cited as analogous to his. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1656.
' Ironically, when the Court was hostile to arbitration it offered public policy as one
of the reasons militating in favor of judicial resolution. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
438 (1953).
Gilmer pointed to bias of the arbitrator, limited discovery, relaxed rules of evidence and the absence of a requirement for written awards as examples. Gilmer, 111 S.
Ct. at 1654-55.
" See id. at 1655.
'
Id. at 1657. In the past the Court pointed to congressional intent to hold that
statutory rights are waivable. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
Now the burden appears to be on the individual opposing arbitration to show that Congress did not intend to preclude waiver. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657. This approach signals
an increasing presumption of arbitrability. See also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 49091 (1987) (FAA preempts state statute that prohibits compulsory arbitration of wage
collection claims).
'a See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653. The attitude that statutory rights must be
guarded by the judiciary is disappearing as the Court changes its focus from defined
legislative policy and processes to achievement of legislative goals. In this case the Court
simply concluded that the remedial and deterrence functions of the statutory scheme can
be achieved through arbitration.
09 Id. at 1654, citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989).
6' See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1656.
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trate his title VII claim."1 As such, the arbitration decision could

only bind the employee for contract-based claims and could not
have preclusive effects on statutory claims.6 2 The Court also observed that in Gardner-Denverthe collective bargaining contract did not require that statutory claims be arbitrated. Further, the Court noted its concern in Gardner-Denverabout the
potential sacrifice of individual statutory rights because the employee was represented by a union that can sacrifice individual
rights for the collective well-being.6 3 Finally, the Court pointed
out that the Gardner-Denverline of cases did not fall under the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")," with its liberal policy favoring arbitration. 5
The Gilmer majority determined that the arbitration clause
was not contained in an employment contract.6 ' This determina-

61Id. at 1657. A possible issue of waiver presented itself, however, because the employee in Gardner-Denveragreed to arbitrate his title VII claim by amending his grievance to include a claim of racial discrimination before arbitration. Further, the collective
bargaining agreement prohibited racial discrimination. However, the arbitrator found
just cause for the discharge and did not mention the title VII issue. Gardner-Denver,415
U.S. 36, 42 (1974).
62 Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 49-50 & 53-54.
Id. at 51. The Court maintained its posture that title VII rights are individual
rights which should be protected from sacrifice in majoritarian processes. It does draw a
line between title VII and other statutes by infusing the dynamic of unions in the process. To the extent that this remains a concern, title VII stays protected. Once it is
determined that these rights can be waived by an "exclusive" representative, the likelihood of survival is small. Reliance will then have to be placed on the union's duty to
represent all employees fairly.
' 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
65 Id. § 2.
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any such contract.
Id. For a discussion of the conflict in the circuits as to the applicability of the FAA to
labor arbitration, see Ray, supra note 21, at 60-67 (arguing that the FAA's legislative
history does not support a conclusion that it applies to labor disputes).
Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657. Gilmer was required by his employer to register with
the New York Stock Exchange as a securities representative. The registration application
provided for arbitration of any dispute arising out of employment or discharge. Since the
arbitration provision appeared on the Stock Exchange application, the FAA was logically
implicated. However, the clause covers "any" dispute arising out of employment. thereby
broadening its scope of coverage. Gilmer was 62-years-old when he was fired and he contended that age discrimination was the cause of his termination. Id. at 1650-51. At a
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tion buttressed the Court's reliance on the FAA's pro-arbitration
posture. However, independent of the FAA, the Court has already documented a healthy regard for arbitration of labor disputes. 6 7 Deference to labor arbitration developed under the La-

bor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") 5 appears to be as
great and equally justifiable as that developed under the FAA
for commercial arbitration.69
D. Clearing the Waiver Hurdle
The Court's rationale in Gilmer poses a serious challenge to
title VII. The Gilmer decision appears to fashion a universal test
for arbitrating statutory issues, which is grounded in the suitability of the arbitral forum for vindicating statutory rights.70
This standard deemphasizes the importance of the forum and
places primary focus on achievement of statutory goals. In the
past, focus on the advantages and disadvantages of judicial versus arbitral resolution took precedence over consideration of
whether a statute's goal could be achieved in either forum. Emphasis on statutory goals weakens a primary pillar of support for
prohibiting waiver of the right to judicial resolution of title VII
claims. It advances the arbitral forum as an effective substitute
for the judiciary71 and shifts attention simultaneously from narminimum, the case is made up of both labor and commercial facts. The dissent chided
the majority for failing to resolve the issue of the FAA's applicability to employment
disputes before rendering its decision. Id. (Stevens, Marshall, J.J., dissenting). In the
dissent's view, any agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of the employment relationship is excluded from FAA coverage.
e See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
48 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1984).
6'See Ray, supra note 20, at 56 (arguing that the FAA creates greater potential for
judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards than standards developed under section 301 of the
LMRA).
70 See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653 ("[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.") (citing Mitsubishi Motors
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 637 (1985)).
7 Arbitration already had a head start in Gardner-Denver where the Court encouraged voluntary settlements and determined that under appropriate circumstances,
the award can be given "great weight" by courts. 415 U.S. 36, 44, 60 (1974). See also
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1983) (encouraging voluntary settlements). The initial attitude that title VII rights cannot be waived is
now being replaced with a requirement that the party objecting to arbitration prove that
Congress intended to preclude waiver. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657. Reference to the text
or legislative history of title VI will be unhelpful to a party objecting to arbitration
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row individual protection to broad statutory goals.
Under the newly crafted standard, remaining factors supporting judicial resolution may be easily overcome. For example,
if the Court continues to sidestep or interpret narrowly the
FAA's exception for employment contracts, it can find an already developed liberal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes under the LMRA.7 2 Apprehensions about the tension between individual versus collective rights under title VII have
been addressed in the past, with the Court erring in favor of
majority rule.7 3 This essentially narrows the question to whether
the employee agreed to arbitrate the issue. Since arbitration is a
creature of contract, employees may soon find that if they personally agree to final and binding arbitration of title VII claims,
they may have waived the right to litigate.1 4 This personal decision to arbitrate an existing or current dispute is more likely to
be enforced by the Court under the Gilmer standard than under
the standard used to evaluate a third party waiver. If an employee empowers a collective bargaining representative to arbitrate an existing title VII dispute, Gilmer suggests that this employee may be bound with finality by the award.
The more troubling questions revolve around a union's ability to waive an employee's right to judicial resolution and the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future title VII disputes under the collective bargaining agreement.7 0 Title VII
rights have always been regarded as personal and non-waivable.
because both are silent on this issue. Further, the Court has already recognized the pocsibility of waiver in the settlement context, Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 52, and this recognition can easily be transferred to arbitration in light of prevailing Court confidence in
this dispute resolution process. If the waiver is knowing and voluntary, and there is no
reason in law or equity that makes the agreement to arbitrate defective, such circumstances can encourage arbitration.
For a different assessment of the Court's view of arbitration, see Jane Byeff Korn,
Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration:A Traditionaland a Feminist View, 1991 U.
ILT. L REv. 67 (contending that the Court still sees arbitration as an inferior resolution
process).
712See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
73 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 US. 50 (1975).
' For a discussion of competing arguments on the waiver issue for both ADEA and
title VII claims, see Ronald Turner, Release and Waiver of Age Discriminationin Employment Act Rights and Claims, 5 LAn. LAw. 739 (Fall 1989).
11 The theoretical basis for giving unions such broad powers would b grounded in a
model where the union and employees' interests are the same with respect to the particular public law. This coherence of interests coupled with the duty of fair representation
can be offered in favor of waiver. See NLRB v. Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
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While the Gardner-DenverCourt encouraged voluntary settlements of disputes,7 it took the position that there can be no
third party or prospective waiver of title VII rights. 7 The pronouncements in Gilmer erode no-waiver assumptions by emphasizing employee freedom of contract, prioritizing statutory goals
over text, and confirming the suitability of the arbitral forum for
resolving statutory issues.
II.

THE UNION AS CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATE

The Court's emerging waiver rules and shift to freedom of
contract analysis in arbitration at least potentially increase the
power of unions to affect the lives of employees protected by
antidiscrimination laws. Whether unions are capable of using
this power in a beneficial manner is a perplexing question. Tracing the historical record and responsibilities of unions in the
area of employment discrimination does, however, suggest some
answers.
A. Early Years of Opposition
As a general proposition, all employees have benefited 8
from the legal recognition of unions. 9 However, unions have historically made distinctions in their representative capacity along
arbitrary or prohibited lines. The experience of blacks is illustrative. For example, emancipated blacks faced the barriers of craft
unionism when they sought employment as freedmen. 0 In con76

Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).

Id. at 36, 52.
78 Some of the more obvious benefits include increased bargaining power, job security through negotiated wages, hours, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment, contractual standards for discipline and discharge and a sense of participation in
the business. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace,
7

25 U. S. F. L. REV. 169, 242-43 (1991).
79 See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 42 Mass. 111 (4 Met.) (1842) (holding that a society
(union) constituted for the purpose of inducing membership and agreeing not to work for
employers who employed non-society members did not amount to conspiracy). Before
Hunt a group of bootmakers were successfully prosecuted for criminal conspiracy when
they struck in an attempt to raise wages. See The Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case, 3 J.

COMMONS ET AL., A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 59-248, reprinted in
STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JANIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 602-15 (1989). Ironically, the same associational ties-essentially a closed

shop-that led to legal recognition of union activities in Hunt, turned out to be a key
vehicle for discrimination in modem times.
60 See ROGER RANSOM & RICHARD SuTcH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM 36, 66 (1977). See
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temporary times the discriminatory purpose and effect of craft
unionism is so well established that courts have taken judicial
notice of it."' Since slavery had for the most part only equipped
blacks for menial jobs, 2 organizing along craft lines effectively
destroyed their eligibility for unionized employment opportunities. This practice continued with the American Federation of
Labor ("AFL")s3 which carved out skilled classes of workers for
representation.8 4 Significant changes did not occur until the
Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO")"5 came along with

its banner of industrial unionism,"' focusing on unskilled and
mass production workers.
Although national and international unions professed and
sometimes strove for equal treatment,8 7 equality remained aspirational since concrete policies and practices to eliminate discrimination were not always implemented.8 As a result, local

also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than The Free" Free
Blacks In Colonial And Antebellum Virginia, 26 HAnv. CR-CL. L. Rsv. 17, 49 (1991).
81 See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 n.1 (1979) (judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper
subject for judicial notice); see id. at 218 ("The gross discrimination against minorities to
which the court adverts-particularly against Negroes in the building trades and craft
unions-is one of the dark chapters in the otherwise great history of the American labor
movement.") (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See generally ABRAm L HARRis, THE NEGRO As CAPITrALIS (American Academy
of Political & Social Science (1936). Blacks were relegated to jobs deemed suitable for
individuals of a servient class. Occupations such as cooking, cleaning, barbering, shoe
shine and repair were essentially the few avenues of employment and income for blacks.
Id.
" See PHILr Tmr, Tim A.F. OF L FRos THE DEATH OF GouxFES To TH MERGER
140-45 (1970).
8Id.

See Jack Barbash, The Rise Of Industrial Unionism, in Wnum
HABER, LABOR
IN A CHANGING AmEmcA 149-50 (1966). The CIO was a spinoff from the AFL as a result
of disagreements about organizing strategies. The disagreement came to a head at the
AFL's 1935 convention and resulted in the split.
" Id. at 150. The CIO was willing to cross industry lines in its attempt to organize
and represent whole industries, instead of carving out workers by craft. Unlike the AFL,
the CIO believed in organization from the outside, rather than waiting for spontaneous
initiatives by inside employees. Id. It also espoused political action in addition to the use
of economic weapons. Id. at 150-51. In 1953 the CIO signed a no-raiding agreement with
the AFL. The two joined forces completely in 1955. Id. at 153.
' See RAY F. IASHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZ=D LABOR 14 (1965). Despite their
advocacy for equality, many national unions kept racial restrictions in their constitutions
up to the middle of this century. Id. at 90.
" See HERBERT HmL, BLAcK LABOR AND THE AtmmcAN LEGAL SYsMA 16-19 (1985)
(noting that the AFL could have included blacks in a unified labor movement, but
moved from espousing equal treatment and membership by acquiescing to the lcals'
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union biases were able to flourish89 and in some respects were
accommodated, 90 to the detriment of black workers. Hence, despite the gains made as labor unions increased in numbers and
broadened their focus, race remained a divisive issue in representation decisionmaking.
This issue of race carried over into the statutory development of labor law. Specifically, the NLRA was passed, but without a specific provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of race. Inclusion of provisions prohibiting discrimination of the
type prohibited by title VII may have set the foundation for coalition building and deterred discriminatory practices at an early
stage.
Although the NLRA sought to reduce industrial strife, it
did not focus on that borne of racial or gender conflict. It is
therefore not surprising that the Act failed to curtail effectively
discriminatory violations of representation obligations. For example, unions excluded blacks from membership solely on the
92
basis of race, 91 maintained segregated locals and closed shops,
caused employers to maintain segregated jobs, 93 negotiated with
employers to deprive black workers of employment opportunities,94 failed to represent black employees while at the same time
funneling their jobs to white employees,95 failed to protect black
employees when the employer violated their contract rights, 0 re-7
fused to process grievances over discriminatory job conditions,
and perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. 8

discriminatory practices and ultimately openly opposing black workers).
" MARSHALL, supra note 87, at 11, 31, 90-91.
oo HML, supra note 88, at 18.
91 Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
92 See James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944); Williams v. Int'l Bhd. of
Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of Am., 165 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1946); Betts v.
Easley, 169 P.2d 831 (Kan. 1946). But see Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959)
(refusing to grant order admitting black employees to union on the basis that the unionnegotiated contract was harmful to black employees' interests).
Syres v. Oil Workers, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1956).
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
" Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
91 Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
"' Houston Maritime Association, 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967).
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B.

The NLRA Experience

The NLRA does not contain a specific textual ban on discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color and religion and the
Board has not interpreted the statute as containing such a ban."
To police discrimination, the Board utilizes an analytical scheme
that couches discriminatory wrongdoing in terms of a breach of
the duty of fair representation, rather than a direct violation of
statutory mandate. 10° The responsibility of representing all employees fairly was judicially regarded as embodied in section 9(a)
of the NLRA, 101 which confers exclusive representative status to
selected unions. °2 While the NLRA makes reference to "discrimination" in section 8(a)(3),10s it does not state a general prohibition against discrimination. This section relates to employers' discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 10
The 1947 amendments to the Act imposed a similar limitation on unions in section 8(b)(2), °5 making it unlawful for a
19See

infra notes 103-04.

100 See infra notes 121-52
101 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29

and accompanying text.
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958). This section provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment

Id.

1202Id. Although section 9(a) further provides that an employee can present grievances directly to the employer, that right is limited to dealings consistent with the collective bargaining agreement and the union must be given an opportunity to be present. Id.
§ 159(a). The insignificance of this right was made patently clear to black employees
trying to deal directly with the employer regarding discrimination concerns in Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). In denying black
employees the right to present their grievances directly to the employer, the Court ruled
that principles of majority rule and exclusivity control since these principles have builtin protections for minorities. Id. at 62-63.
103 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1959).
10,Id. See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (section 8(a)(3) does
not prohibit all discrimination, only discrimination that encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization). See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941) (employer's refusal to hire union members violated section 8(a)(3)).
1Of 61 Stat 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1958), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 153-160 (Supp. H 1961). Commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley amendments, these provisions sought to qualify the hands-off approach developed earlier by
courts under the Norris LaGuardia Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). See Jacksonville
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union
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure
to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership.100

Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) clearly tie the word discrimination to the terms and conditions of employment and an employee's union status. 1 07 This has made it difficult for employees
to contend that these sections constitute broader prohibitions of
discrimination. A valiant attempt was made in Packinghouse
Workers v. NLRB 0 to employ the Act in race discrimination
Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Longshoremen, 457 U.S. 702, 715 (1982) (holding that federal
judges should not decide labor disputes and not grant injunctions because judges' social
and economic views colored their assessments of the legitimate objectives of unions). See
also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S.
429 (1987) (offering broad interpretation of section 13(c) of the Norris LaGuardia Act to
allow secondary picketing by unions). Abuses by unions partly triggered statutory control of certain union conduct and the amendment gave employees the right to refrain
from union activities and imposed restrictions on unions similar to those imposed on
employers under the Wagner Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(4). The amendments also increased the role of law in section 301 suits by or against unions under the LMRA. See 61
Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Section 185(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employee and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id. See also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)(section 301 gives federal courts jurisdiction and more).
106 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)(1958). Although section 8(a)(3) prohibited employer discrimination on the basis of union membership, it provided that unions could negotiate
security agreements which required membership as a condition of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3). Therefore section 8(b)(2) made the discrimination limitation of section
8(a)(3) applicable to unions and further limited membership to dues and fees. See Radio
Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (the purpose of section 8(b)(2) is to insulate
employee job rights from organizational rights to grant full freedom to participate, not
participate or be indifferent to union affairs).
107 Employer discrimination against employees filing charges or giving testimony
under the Act is also prohibited under section 8(a)(4) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)
(1959). A corollary limitation was not placed on unions under section 8(b). However,
section 8(b)(1)(A), which prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees' exercise of section 7 rights, has been interpreted to provide such a limitation. See NLRB v.
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
108 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
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cases.1 0

9

In Packinghouse Workers the court found that invidious
race discrimination by an employer violates section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. 110 Reading section 7 of the NLRA broadly, the court
determined that discrimination inhibits concerted activities by
12
dividing workers11 ' and deterring claims against the employer.
However, the Board did not adopt this analytical scheme. Instead, it ruled that absent "actual evidence" of a nexus between
the discriminatory conduct and the interference, the Act is not
violated. 1 ' So far the Supreme Court has declined opportunities
to address this issue, leaving the Board and lower courts some
flexibility.

114

Racial discrimination was to some extent regulated under
the Act by the abolition of closed shops. 1 Section 8(a)(3) under
the Wagner Act left unions in control of an employee's future by
allowing them to require membership as a prerequisite to initial
or continued employment. 11 6 Black employees were effectively
shut out from employment opportunities and benefits by simply
1'9This case raised the question of whether or not employer discrimination on the
basis of race or national origin violated the Act's specific section 8(a)(1) mandate. 416
F.2d at 1133. The Union argued that the Board's determination that section 8(a)(5) was
violated when the employer bargained in bad faith over race and national origin discrimination did not go far enough, and contended that the employer's conduct also violated
section 8(a)(1). Id. at 1126.
210 Id. at 1133.
" Id. at 1135 ("[R]acial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests between groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and the effectivenes3 of
their working in concert to achieve their legitimate goals under the Act."). The court
found that toleration of employer discrimination will only promote a divide and conquer
mentality in an environment where integration was in the workers' collective best interest. Id.
12 Id. ("[R]acial discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility which
inhibits them from asserting their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination.").
22 Jubilee Manufacturing Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), afl'd sub. nom., Steelworkers v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
11l Black Grievance Comm. v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.4 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985) (citing Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), for the
proposition that race discrimination by itself is not a violation of the Act); Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 68 n.23 (1975) (noting
that Packinghouse Workers raised the question whether the NLRA prohibits race
discrimination).
'" Closed shop agreements permitted only union members to work. By denying
blacks membership, unions were able to use this security arrangement effectively to discriminate. See supra notes 92 & 106 and accompanying text.
116See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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being refused membership. The Taft-Hartley amendments curtailed this practice by abolishing the option of negotiating "security" agreements which limited opportunities solely to union
members. 117 This development, in conjunction with section
8(a)(3)'s provision that an employer cannot discriminate unless
membership is available to all on an equal basis, limited a
union's discretion in making race-based decisions. 118 Further
protection against discrimination came in the Board's ruling
that section 7 is implicated and section 8(a)(1) violated when an
employer refuses to recall black employees who filed racial discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") against the employer. 1 '
C.

The Duty of Fair Representation and the National Labor
Relations Act

Despite the absence of a specific statutory mandate prohibiting discrimination in the NLRA, the Board ultimately determined that the Act is violated when unions make race-based decisions in their capacity as bargaining representatives.1 2 The
genesis of such NLRA violations was Supreme Court doctrine
that formulated a duty of fair representation ("DFR") for
117See Michael I. Sovern, The NationalLabor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. R .563 (1962) (discussing lawful mechanisms designed by unions
to effectuate discrimination and the Board's response in trying to protect black
employees).

"08
The

amendments provide:

That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership.
9 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
11 Frank Briscoe v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981).
120 See Independent Metal Workers, Local No. 1 & Independent Metal Workers
Union, Local No. 2, 147 NLRB 1573 (1964). The Board's first clear statement that it
would generally regard a breach of the duty fair representation as an unfair labor practice came in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1962). The Board adhered to its position, as illustrated by the Hughes Tool
decision despite the Second Circuit's refusal to go along with it. However, other circuits
found the Board's approach acceptable. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379
F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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unions.121
In Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.

Co. 1 2

2

the Court

found that the provision for majority rule and exclusive representative status in the Railway Labor Act ("RLA")1 23 brought
with it the responsibility to represent all employees fairly.1 24 A
union could not deprive blacks of membership and make arrangements with the company to deprive them of positions and
promotions solely on the basis of their race.12 The Court ruled
that principles of "majority rule" and "exclusivity" placed a
union in the position of a legislature. As a result, unions 1must
2
represent all employees fairly, impartially and in good faith. 1 It
further ruled that variations in rights based on relevant differences are appropriate, while variations based on race are irrelevant and invidious.127 While this DFR evolved under the RLA,
the reasoning was soon adopted in the NLRA case of Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB. 28 Specific application of the Steele doctrine to

121 See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The 1935
Wagner Act had only established unfair labor practices for employers. Unfair labor practices for unions were later added in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley amendments. 29 US.C.
§158(b). The 1947 amendments did not specifically legislate either that unions had a
DFR, or that breach of this duty constituted an unfair labor practice. As a result, no
statutory basis existed for finding union discrimination a violation of the Act by the
Court in Steele. Even after the Act was amended in 1947, the Board took the position
that breach of the DFR did not constitute an unfair labor practice. The Court did not
clearly change course until its Mirandadecision. See Neil M. Herring, The "FairRepresentation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination?,24
1M. L REv. 113 (1964); Archibald Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 VML L Ray.
151 (1957). Before the Court's decision in Steele, the Board had interpreted the NLRA
as requiring fair representation by unions only to the extent of representation obligations
noted in section 9 of the statute. See Bernard D. Meltzer, The NationalLabor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination:The More Remedies, The Better?, 42 U. C. L. REv. 1
(1974).
12 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
12 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
124 Steele, 323 U.S. at 202.
22 Id. at 199.
126 Section 2, Fourth of the RLA provides: "Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority
of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the
representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act." 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth
(1958), 48 Stat. 1187 (1934). The Court interpreted this provision as carrying a congressionally-imposed obligation to use the power granted for the benefit of all, without bias.
Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
127 Id. at 203.
12 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
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the NLRA came later in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman.129
In Railway Mail Association v. Corsi1 30 the Court found

that a union's limitation of membership to whites and Native
Americans can be invalidated by state law, since a state can pro-

tect workers excluded solely on the basis of race. 131 In addition,
one state supreme court ruled that public policy and the principle of exclusivity required that closed shop agreements be enjoined and blacks be admitted to membership on equal terms. 3 2
Further, in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard3 3 the

Court ruled that a union could not use the powers it was granted
by Congress to destroy black employees' jobs by failing to represent them, while at the same time promoting the interest of
white employees.13 Moreover, in Conley v. Gibson 35 the Court

noted that a union's responsibility includes taking affirmative
steps to protect black employees.1 3 This duty included taking
steps to protect black employees from an employer's unilateral
13 7
act that violated the contract.
Failure to represent black workers fairly,1 38 refusal to pro-

129 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953). The DFR therefore became the civil rights vehicle
for racial discrimination victims until the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See
Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L-R. 127, 128-130 & n.11 (1992) (noting that the first 20 years of Supreme Court
DFR jurisprudence consisted of racial discrimination decisions, except in Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman).
1 0 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
'1 Id. at 94.
1M2 See James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329, 340 (Cal. 1944); Williams v. Int'l
Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers of America, 165 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1946).
Despite the courts' holdings, the potential for segregated locals remained if they were
shown to be equal to white locals. In both cases the unions operated all white locals and
auxiliary black locals. The unions also insisted that the employer discharge blacks who
did not join the black locals. The trial court in James enjoined the closed shop and the
white local's refusal to admit blacks on the same terms as whites. However, the California Supreme Court did not interpret the district court's order in James as requiring the
union to admit blacks to white locals. It viewed the order as simply enjoining maintenance of a closed shop and closed union, remanding the case for findings on whether the
black auxiliaries were inferior to the white locals.
133 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
134

Id. at 774.

355 U.S. 41 (1957).
at 46.
237 Id. But see Cox, supra note 122, at 151 (contending that a union's duty does not
extend this far).
'" Independent Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
23

1Id.
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cess grievances alleging discriminatory job conditions,1 0 and
perpetuating the effects of past discrimination,140 were all held
to violate the Act. This posture was first adopted in Miranda
Fuel Co. Inc. 141 where the Board brought fair representation

claims within the ambit of unfair labor practice ("ULP") proceedings. In Miranda Fuel the Board held that breach of the
DFR also constituted a violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2). 42 The Board reasoned that improper performance of a
union's duty under section 9 of the Act amounted to an infringement of section 7 rights, thereby violating section 8(b)(1)(A). 45
In addition, arbitrary union conduct, with its tendency to encourage or discourage membership, was held violative of section
8(b)(2).'" The Board further ruled that a union's failure to process a black employee's grievance because of his race violated
sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3).14 5 The Board reached
the same result for a union's refusal to process grievances over
discriminatory job conditions in Local 12, Rubber Workers v.
NLRB. 4 Recently, the Court reaffirmed the principles outlined
47
in Miranda Fuel.
As MirandaFuel's progeny developed, it became clear that
breach of the DFR would not always amount to a ULP. The
Board attempted to apply the ULP analysis to representation
proceedings, but soon found itself in retreat. In Bekins Moving
19 Local Union No. 12, United Rubber v. NLRB, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1968).
140 Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967), enforcement denied, 426 F.2d
584 (5th Cir. 1970).
141 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Although the Second Circuit denied enforcement, it did not resolve the question of
whether a union's breach of its DFR may also constitute an unfair labor practice.
142 140 N.L.R.B. at 190, 326 F.2d at 175. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this Title: Provided,
That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1988).
1'3 Miranda Fuel, 326 F.2d at 174-75.

14 Id. at 175.
1,5 See Independent

Metal Workers, 147 N.LI.B. 1573 (1964).
246 United Rubber, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1968). The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Board that section
8(b)(1)(A) was violated, thus finding it unnecessary to rule on sections 8(b)(2) and (3).
1' See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S.
67 (1989).
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and Storage Co. 148 the Board ruled that it could not certify a
union without considering allegations of discriminatory conduct,
since to do so would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and governmental policy. 149 But the potential
for finding a ULP for breach of the DFR in all proceedings
under the Act was destroyed in Handy Andy Inc.15 0 In Handy
Andy the Board ruled that it would no longer consider claims of
race discrimination by unions before certification.151 It held that
the only time racial discrimination will be considered in the representation context is when it affects employees in the selection
of their bargaining representative. 15 2

148

211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).

149 Id. at 138-39. The Board held:

[As] an arm of the Federal Government, to confer the benefits of certification
upon a labor organization which is shown to be engaging in a pattern and practice of invidious discrimination, the power of the Federal Government would
surely appear to be sanctioning and indeed furthering, the continued practice
of such discrimination, thereby running afoul of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.
Id. See also NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 930 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
541 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977) (race discrimination that
constitutes unfair representation is proper consideration when Board is considering certification petition); NLRB v. Mansion House Center Mgt. Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir.
1973) (remedial machinery of Board should not be made available to union unwilling to
correct history of racial discrimination).
150 228 N.L.R.B. 447 (1977). The Handy Andy decision marked the beginning of the
Board's retreat from Bekins. After Handy Andy the Board decided sua sponte to reconsider Bell & Howell & Local 399, Int'l Union of Oper. Eng. AFL-CIO, 220 N.L.R.B. 881
(1975). A supplemental decision was issued, 230 N.L.R.B. 420 (1977), relying on the principles outlined in Handy Andy. The employer was ordered to bargain, thereby effectuating the Board's initial decision to certify the union as the employees' collective bargaining representative. The employer refused to bargain and the Board sought enforcement
in the D.C. Circuit. 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979). In
enforcing the order, the court ruled that the NLRA's primary purpose was not the eradlcation of employment discrimination. Id. at 148. It found that the EEOC was specifically
created for this purpose and the Board's participation in this field would, in effect, duplicate efforts by a less expert agency. Id. at 147-48. It also ruled that the Fifth Amendment is not violated when a discriminating union is certified, but rather certification
imposed an obligation on the union not to discriminate. Id. at 149.
"' Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. at 448. The Board ruled that a ULP proceeding was
the only vehicle for addressing such conduct. It abandoned the Bekins Fifth Amendment
reasoning, stating that certification is not tantamount to approval or protection of union
discriminatory activities, nor analogous to state action. Id. at 450. See also Bell & Howell
Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 420 (1977), enforced, 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
942 (1979) (union's DFR does not arise until the union actually represents employees).
12 For example, appeals to racial prejudice have been used by companies and unions to affect employee representation choices. In Sewell Mfg., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962),
the Board held that it will not tolerate propaganda that inflames racial feelings in union
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By limiting consideration of race to ULP cases, the Board

stymied the Act's potential to address the discriminatory organizational legacies of unions, which arguably affect black employ-

ees even today.153 Moreover, capturing race discrimination
through the DFR is not foolproof."" In addition, if a discriminating employer accords privileged status to a non-majority
union, and that union refuses to grieve allegations of race discrimination, no DFR is breached.15 5 This leaves minority em-

ployees in a bind because they cannot use self-help and are unlikely to get their desired relief by appealing to the employer.'
The Handy Andy decision undermined one of the few instances
when employer advocacy benefited minorities by elevating the
policy favoring collective bargaining over the policy prohibiting
57
discrimination.1
D.

Gilmer and the Board's Deferral Policy

The Gilmer decision paves the way for further Board withdrawal from the field of employment discrimination. Since dis-

crimination in employment was specifically prohibited by title
VII, some questions were raised about the application of the

NLRA to discrimination disputes.1 8 The Board and lower courts

voters. In setting aside the election, the NLRB found that the employer propaganda
which, among other things, linked unions to integration, destroyed the reasoning faculty
of voters. It held that propaganda with racial overtones must be temperate in tone, germane and factually correct. Id. at 71-72.
I" See Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 458 (1977) (Jenkins, Member, d senting)
(certifying a discriminating union fosters and perpetuates discrimination). But see
Jonathan G. Axelrod & Howard S. Kaufman, Mansion House-Behins-HandyAndy: The
National Labor Relation Board's Role in Racial DiscriminationCases, 45 GEo. WAsh.
L. Rav. 675 (1977) (the Board does not have a statutory or constitutional obligation to
refuse to certify a union and the Bekins decision was an abuse of discretion).
154 See Herring, supra note 121, at 146-48.
155 See Black Grievance Comm. v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1008 (1985). Indeed, the DFR is created only by the grant of exclusive representative status when a union is recognized or certified under section 9(a) of the NLRA. See
supra note 120.
1m Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975)
(minority employees may not circumvent an exclusive, elected union and picket or bargain separately).
157 Under the Bekins formulation, employers, primarily out of self-interest in avoiding unions, policed and advocated against discriminatory union conduct. Some courts
regarded discriminatory conduct as an employer defense to a union's refusal to bargain
charge. See NLRB v. Mansion House Center Mgt., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
I" See Mark D. Roth, The RelationshipBetween Title VII and the NLRA: "Get-
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gave conflicting interpretations of whether these two statutes
were independent or interchangeable. 159 While the Supreme
Court recognized that discrimination can still be regulated by

the NLRA, it ultimately suggested that the primary vehicle for
pursuing such claims is title VII.16 0 In Handy Andy the Board
noted that protection from invidious racial discrimination by

unions can be found in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.161 Modeled in many respects after the NLRA, 16 2 title VII

ting Our Acts Together" in Race DiscriminationCases, 23 ViiL. L. REv. 68 (1978) (noting the confusion caused by title VII overlapping with the NLRA, and that title VII did
not oust the Board of jurisdiction); Axelrod & Kaufman, supra note 153, at 675 (NLRA
did not legislate a civil rights role for the NLRB, but title VII did not oust Board of
jurisdiction); Meltzer, supra note 121, at 1 (questioning the benefits of overlapping relief
in title VII and the NLRA); Earl M. Leiken, The Current and PotentialEqual Employment Role of The NLRB, 1971 DuKe L.J. 833 (Board can interpret NLRA broadly to
cover racial discrimination).
lg See Roth, supra note 158, at 81-89 (discussing various formulations by the Board
and lower courts and calling on the Board to establish a uniform policy to deal with race
bias claims).
160 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (finding that the NLRA did not protect picketing black employees alleging discrimination because of paramount statutory principle of exclusivity; however, title VII
may protect such employees); Kenneth T. Lopatka, Protection Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act for Employees Who Protest
Discriminationin PrivateEmployment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1179 (1975). But see Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974) (citing legislative history to support the proposition that title VII does not oust the Board of jurisdiction); Frank Briscoe
Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981) (availability of relief for aggrieved black employees under the Civil Rights Act does not oust the Board of jurisdiction); Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1138 n.11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969) (noting that an amendment by Senator Tower which would have ousted the
Board of jurisdiction in race discrimination cases was rejected).
161Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 450 (1977). 42 U.S.C. §§ 20O0e-2000e 17 (1988).
This statute is replete with prohibitions against union decisionmaking based on race.
Although sections 2000e(d) and (e) provide broad definitions of unions, title VII litigation remains focused on employers. The statute's coverage of unions include national,
international, state and local entities and agents. We have seen the application of sections 2000e-2(c)(1) and (c)(3) because section 703(c)(1) contains a general ban on discrimination, while section 703(c)(3) protects against the union causing employers to discriminate. Section 2000e-2(c) states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a
labor organization (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin; to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual ......
162 See H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2426
(statement of George Meader) ("The title creates a new Federal independent agency
similar to the National Labor Relations Board ... ."). In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975), the Court noted that- "The 'make whole' purpose of Title VII is
made evident by the legislative history. The backpay provision was expressly modeled on
the backpay provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Under that Act, '[m]aking
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deals extensively with prohibited union conduct.10 3 The enforcement and remedial schemes of title VII and the NLRA are also
notably similar. 1 4
In many ways the enactment of title VII provided the Board
with a statutory excuse for avoiding discrimination claims. Further, rights provided by the NLRA have not been guarded in the
past by the Board as title VII rights were guarded by the Court.
For example, in MetropolitanEdison Co. v. NLRB 0I the Court
ruled that a union could waive employees' NLRA rights provided there is clear and unmistakable contractual authority to

do so."6'
Some commentators have advanced an even broader theory
of waiver, arguing that employees automatically waive many
statutory rights once the bargaining representative negotiates a
contract that provides for arbitration.0 7 It has also been suggested that an arbitrator's construction favoring waiver is an adequate substitute for the Court's "explicit" requirement in Met6 ' Further, deference
ropolitan Edison."
should be given to an
arbitrator's construction that favors waiver, provided it draws its
16 9
essence from the contract.
Fortunately, the waiver frenzy has not expanded to title VII
claims. In fact, supporters of broad waiver schemes have specifically excluded from coverage title VII claims and other disputes

the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the
vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces'." (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941)). See also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Amot. v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 446 n.26 (1986); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989 (8th Cir.
1984) (no compensatory damages under either statute); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251
F. Supp. 184, 186 MD. Tenn. 1966) (enforcement provisions of title VII patterned after
NLRA); Predmore v. Allen, 407 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (D. Md. 1976) (bacLkpay); Beesley v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 644 (N.D. AI. 1989) (jury trial).
163 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) et seq.
I" See supra note 162.
161 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
10 Id. at 709 n.13. See also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (remanding for a determination of waiver in light of several contract provisions).
16' See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to
Bargain:A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 Oto ST.LJ. 23
(1985); Calvin William Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to Grievance-Arbitration:A General
Theory, 48 Omo ST.L.J. 595 (1987) (critiquing waiver theories and calling for the Board
to defer to the collective bargaining process on the basis of protection afforded by the
NLRA and DFR).
168Edwards, supra note 167, at 39.
169Id.
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where the employee and union interests conflict.1 70 Underscoring
the exemption for title VII is the assumption that such rights
are non-waivable. Waiver theories for some statutory rights are
interwoven with the union's DFR."1 1 The belief is that individual
rights can be protected through the union's representation obligations. In theory, and in some instances, this may be true.
However, when the dispute revolves around prohibited discrimination under title VII and worse, if the union is implicated in
the wrongdoing, the benefits of the DFR evaporate.
Under its deferral rules, 7 2 the Board already allows arbitrators to decide statutory claims that also qualify as ULPs. In
Spielberg Mfg. Co.1 " the Board ruled that an arbitral award

should be recognized if: (1) the arbitrator was presented generally with facts relevant to resolving the ULP charge; (2) the
ULP and contract issues were factually parallel; (3) the proceedings were fair and regular; (4) the parties had agreed the award
would be binding; and (5) the arbitrator's decision was not
17 4
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the NLRA.
170 See

generally Edwards, supra note 167, at 23; Sharpe, supra note 167, at 595.
Of course the most prominent argument against waiver is the distinction between
statutory and contract rights, and the non-delegable responsibility of courts and the
Board to enforce statutory rights.
172 See Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 746 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (pointing out that pre- and post-arbitral deferral should be more appropriately called deferment and deference respectively); Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d
1486, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Pre-arbitral deferral (what we will, for clarity's sake, call
'deferment') resembles the exhaustion requirements often found in administrative regimes and the abstention doctrines employed by federal courts. Post-arbitral deferral
(what we will call 'deference') resembles appellate judicial deference.").
173 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For the Board's prearbitral deferral policy, see United
Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) (holding that prearbitral deferral is permissible for both refusal to bargain and individual rights claims). The Board noted that:
"The Board's process may always be invoked if the arbitral result is inconsistent with
the standard of Spielberg." Id. at 560. This broad deferral policy can be traced back to
Dubo Manufacturing Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963) (holding that charges alleging discriminatory termination under section 8(a)(3) may be held in abeyance pending arbitration to effectuate section 203(d)'s encouragement of private resolution); Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841-42 (1981) (holding that prearbitral deferral is proper for
refusal to bargain cases when: (1) the parties have a long and productive relationship; (2)
the employer is not motivated by enmity to employees protected rights; (3) the employer
is willing to arbitrate; (4) there exists a broad arbitration clause that arguably covers the
dispute; and (5) contractual provisions are at the center of the dispute). See also Local
Union No. 2188 v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974)
(upholding deferral policy in Collyer); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1982) (extending deferral to section 8(a)(1) and (3) complaints).
17 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. See also Yourga Trucking Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972)
171
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This standard of deferral was later broadened when the Board
ruled that an arbitral award had preclusive effects although the
arbitrator had neither heard nor decided the ULP issue. 1 ° This
ruling represented a departure from the Board's initial application of the Spielberg doctrine, which emphasized the need to
protect employees' statutory rights that were not fully
litigated.176
The Board's post-arbitral deferral rules changed again in
Olin Corp."7 when the Board announced that it would only defer in cases where the arbitrator had heard and decided the statutory issue. 1 8 The Olin decision also outlined new standards to
determine when a ULP issue was heard and decided. Under the
Olin test the Board could defer if the arbitrator was presented
with general relevant facts about a statutory violation that was
17
parallel to the contract claim.

Further pronouncements in Olin tie in neatly with the
Court's deferral policy in Gilmer. Olin provided that Spielberg's
"clearly repugnant" standard would not be satisfied by a mere
showing that the arbitrator's award is inconsistent with the
NLRA.18 0 Rather, a test that closely resembles the standard for
court deference to an arbitrator's award was adopted. The Board
established a "palpably wrong" standard which required deference as long as the award is susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the NLRA. 51 This standard suggests that deference

(emphasizing the importance of the arbitrator considering the unfair labor practice issues as a prerequisite for deferral).
111See Electronic Reprod. Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
1'8 See, e.g., Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963),.enforcement denied on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964). Electronic Reproduction was subsequently overruled by Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980) (requiring that the
party seeking deferral prove the arbitrator heard the unfair labor practice issue).
1" 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
178Id. at 575.
178Id. at 574.
We would find that an arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor
practice if (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts
relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. In this respect, differences, if
any, between the contractual and statutory standards of review should be
weighed by the Board as part of its determination under the Spielberg standards of whether an award is clearly 'repugnant' to the Act.
Id.
180 Id.
181

"[W]ith regard to the inquiring into the 'clearly repugnant' standard, we would
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is appropriate as long as the award draws its "essence" from the
statute, much as court deference is appropriate when an award
draws it essence from the contract. 82
Olin's procedural requirement that the party opposing
deferral demonstrates that the standard for deferral is not
met'5s also dovetails with Gilmer's requirement that the 'party
opposing arbitration show congressional intent to preclude
waiver of the statutory right."8 Application of a stringeit test
for disregarding an arbitral award, combined with tough burdens
on employees attacking the suitability of the arbitral process for
resolving their statutory claims, commits the Board to a deferral-ready posture.
The Board's growing willingness to defer is not limited to
the NLRA. In the title VII context Gardner-Denver laid the
foundation for Board deferral when the Court ruled that "great
weight" may be given to an arbitral decision that fully considers
an employee's statutory rights. The Court listed factors such as
the arbitrator's competence, the adequacy of the record, the extent of procedural fairness, and the presence of title VII-like
provisions in the contract.""
Additionally, Gilmer provides favorable presumptions about
the competence of arbitrators and the quality of the arbitral
process which, in many respects, put arbitration on a par with
the judicial process. Such high regard for arbitration fortifies the
Board's pro-deferral posture by suggesting that the Board's statutory mandate may be effectuated through arbitration. It may
seem logical to the Board that if the Court concluded that an
not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board precedent. Unless
the award is 'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an
interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer." Id.
182 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597-98 (1960) (as long as award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
contract, ambiguities in the arbitration award should not prevent its enforcement); Carey
v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964) (Board has broad discretion to defer to
arbitration to further the fundamental aims [of private resolution] of the Act).
183 [W]e would require that the party seeking to have the Board reject deferral
and consider the merits of a given case show that the above standards for
deferral have not been met. Thus, the party seeking to have the Board ignore
the determination of an arbitrator has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the defects of the arbitral process or award.
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
184 Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1657-59 (1991).
18 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
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employee's statutory rights may be vindicated effectively in arbitration, a similar conclusion by an agency would not constitute
abdication of statutory responsibility. Further, the Board may
cite its review powers as providing the necessary check on errant
arbitral decisions.
However, although the Board's deferral rules originated
from a legitimate balancing of statutory mandate under the
NLRA'88 and national policy favoring arbitration under the
LMRA,8s1 their evolution has been highly politicized.18 s As a result, the level of agency protection afforded individual statutory
rights has fluctuated with changing administrations. As noted
earlier, the Bush Administration favored arbitral resolution of
title VII claims. e9 If past partisan responses are a reliable predictor, the current Board will likely leave initial enforcement responsibilities to the arbitrator9 0 and maintain a broad deferential standard of review. Such a development would be a harmful
abandonment of statutory responsibility because of the tension
between employees and their bargaining representative when the
dispute involves discrimination. The need for Board involvement becomes even more compelling when discriminatory union
conduct, which also qualifies as a ULP, is at issue. Simultaneous
deference by the Board and courts to the arbitral forum would
significantly dilute employees' great need for statutory
protections.
E. The Title VII Experience
Unlike the NLRA, title VII was specifically designed to ad29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988) (delineating the Board's power to prevent ULPs and
specifically providing that Board processes takes precedence over contractual or other
legal processes).
187 See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). For a recent example of
the balancing the Board engages in when deciding whether to defer, see Hammontree v.
NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
1I For a good sense of the Board's ideological underpinnings and its impact on deci.
sionmaking, see Terry A. Bethel, Recent Decisions of the NLRB-The Reagan Influence,
60 IND. LJ. 227 (1985); David L. Gregory & Raymond T. lak, Significant Decisions of
the NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board's "Celebration" of the 50th Anniversary of the
National Labor Relations Act, 18 CoNN. L. RIv. 7 (1985).
'89 See supra note 19.
190 For a discussion of the Board's prearbitral deferral rules, see United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). See also Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.RIB. 837
(1971).
186
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dress race, sex and other forms of discrimination and detailed a
union's responsibility in this area. Under title VII protected employees have sometimes found unions to be indifferent or even
adversarial. Although the forms and shades of discrimination
change, discriminatory union conduct lingers. Accordingly, there
continues to be reservations about unions' ability to operate in a
race-neutral manner or serve as effective advocates of title VII
rights. Title VII was enacted much later than the NLRA and, as
a result, it polices discriminatory union conduct that is often
subtle. 11 For example, it is now uncommon to see attempts to
exclude blacks or other protected groups from union membership or negotiated provisions designed to subjugate minority
workers.192 In title VII cases one is more likely to encounter
union acquiescence in employers' discriminatory conduct. 9 3
Such acquiescence, when it occurs, is not tolerated by courts and
any contention that it is strategically advantageous to proceed in
a race-neutral way must be proven.""' The following cases provide some insight into the performance of unions under title VII.
191 See Meese v. Segar, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1115 (1985) (finding modem discrimination much more subtle than in the past).
192 But see Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986), where the union used four-year apprenticeship program to exclude non-whites
from union membership. Among other things, the union used nepotism, exam and diploma requirements, the recall of white pensioners, grants of temporary work permits
and temporary white workers from sister locals to exclude effectively minorities from the
sheet metal trade. Like many other unions, the sheet metal workers were organized over
a century ago as a "white" union and Local 28 was later formed as a "white local," with
racial restrictions in its constitution. Although its constitution's racial restrictions were
deleted in 1946, blacks were not admitted until 1969. Id. at 427 n.2. However, such admission was grudgingly granted and attempts to change the racially restrictive policy
were met with stiff resistance and extended litigation. The Local litigated from 1964 to
1986 to maintain its practice of discriminatory exclusion of non-whites, responding to
court orders with token gestures and contempt. Specifically, a New York State court
found that the Local's union practices constituted discrimination in violation of state
law. State Comm'r for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc.2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (S. Ct.
N.Y. County 1964). In 1975 a United States district court enjoined the same practices on
the basis that they violated title VII and state law. Local 28 v. N.Y. State Dir. of Human
Rights, 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This decision was affirmed in almost every
respect by the Second Circuit and remanded. 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976). A modified
plan was soon affirmed. 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977). The union did not seek certiorari,but
simply disregarded court orders that resulted in contempt proceedings in 1982 and 1983.
Years later the findings of contempt were affirmed. 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985). Only
then did the union finally petition for certiorari,essentially protesting the remedial measures instituted by the lower courts-not the consistent findings of discrimination.
193 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
194Id. at 657-58.
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In Terrell v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co." 5 the Fifth Circuit
held that title VII was violated when the union breached its
DFR by failing to take "every reasonable step" to eliminate a
discriminatory seniority system.196 Other circuits, including the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, have also imposed a duty on unions to try to eliminate discriminatory contract provisions during negotiations. 9 e
Similarly, in Howard v. Internal Molders and Allied Workers Union"' the Eleventh Circuit fleshed out the union's responsibility under section 703(c)(3) of title VII. 9 9 This section essentially tracks the language of section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. 2°°
Both provisions prohibit a union from causing or attempting to
cause an employer to discriminate. The plaintiffs in Howard
contended that the union acquiesced to a facially neutral test
implemented by the company that had a discriminatory impact
on black employees, thereby violating title VII.2 01 Reading section 703(c)(3) broadly, the court agreed and found that the
union representative's criticism of the test and the white union
committee's demands that the company cease using the test did
not satisfy the union's duty under the Act. 0 2 It noted that although the union had no evidence that it would have been
rebuffed by the company had objections to the test been made,
the test was neither grieved nor bargained over during
20 3
negotiations.
Another acquiescence
case decided under section

195 644 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981).
19 Id.
at 1120.
197 See Freeman v. Motor Convoy, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983); Wattleton v. Int'l

Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local # 1509, 686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.I. Co., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982).
19' 779 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1982). This section provides: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for a labor organization... (3) to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section."
200 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958), 61 Stat. 141 (1947). Section 8(b)(2) provides, in
part: "It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(2) to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee." Section 703(c)(3)
appears to be broader to the extent it protects "individuals" as oppczed to "employees."
See supra note 161.
20l Howard v. Int'l Molders and Allied Workers Union, 779 F.2d 1546, 1547 (11th

Cir. 1986).
202

Id. at 1548.

203 Id.
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703(c)(1)204 addressed a union's contention that title VII does

not prohibit union passivity in the face of employer discrimination, particularly when the union had no anti-black animus. ° In
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.20 8 the union failed to challenge

discriminatory discharges of black employees, refused to file
grievances alleging race discrimination, and tolerated racial harassment in the workplace. 207 The collective bargaining agreement had an antidiscrimination clause which, ironically, the employer had insisted on during negotiations. 20 8 The union argued
that it did not cause or attempt to cause the employer to discriminate and therefore did not violate the Act.2 09 Further, the
union asserted that it preferred to couch grievances in race-neutral terms because the employer would "get its back up" if race
bias was charged. 210 The court found that section 703(c)(1) spe-

cifically prohibited the union from ignoring racial grievances, 1
and the absence of racial motivation did not relieve it of statutory responsibility. 2 2 Further, the union's general behavior did
not support its contention that its failure to act was strategic. 218
F. Unions and Affirmative Action
As employers watched the Court hand down liberal interpretations of title VII, it became apparent that voluntary resolutions of allegations of discrimination were pragmatic. Voluntary
resolutions often took the form of settlements with consent decrees 214 which included affirmative action plans.21

5

These plans,

204 This section provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
organization-(1) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
205 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
204 Id. at 656.
207 Id. at 659-60.
208 Id. at 666 n.11.
209 Id. at 667. This argument was premised on the belief that the controlling statutory provision was section 703(c)(3), which sets out this standard. See supra note 161.
The union further argued that title VII does not prohibit union passivity in the face of
employer discrimination. 482 U.S. at 665.
210 Id. at 668.
21 Id. at 669.
212 Id.
212 Id. The Goodman Court noted several additional instances of employer discrimination where the union failed to act despite the obvious need for union intervention. Id.
at 668 n.13.
2'4 For a good discussion of the frequent usage and the advantages and disadvan-
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intended to remedy past wrongs, have not met with universal
union support. In fact, for many reasons such plans are viewed
as antagonistic to the union's representation mandate. In cases
where such attitudes prevail, unions have not garnered collective
support, resulting in suspicion and acrimony between competing
groups of union employees. Further, some plans have been challenged by unions as violative of the collective bargaining contract, title VII and the federal Constitution.2 16 W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Rubber Workers
exemplifies the protracted litigation and
arbitrations that challenges to affirmative action plans can trigger. Such challenges have yielded conflicting and sometimes punitive results for employers, chilling desires to remediate, and
inhibiting achievement of the national goal of equal employment
for all.218 Regardless of the outcome of such challenges, all par-

tages of consent decrees, see generally Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law By Pivate
Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness Of Negotiated InstitutionalReform, 1984 Duw LJ. 887.
2 See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'L Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986) (city of New York adopted a plan in 1970 requiring contractors on city
projects to hire one minority trainee for every four journeymen union members); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (school board and union added provision to
the collective bargaining agreement to protect minority teachers in the event of layoffs);
Local No. 93, Int'L Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 US. 501 (1986) (city
of Cleveland and black and Hispanic firefighters agreed to a plan that reerved promotions in certain job categories to minorities and established promotion goals in others);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (city of Memphis and
black firefighters agreed on promotions, back pay, vacancy and promotion goals); United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (company and union negotiated a
plan that reserved 50 percent of craft training openings to blacks).
218 Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 421 (affirmative action goal and fund challenged by union as violation of Title VII and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Weber, 443 U.S. at 193 (white employee contended that craft training positions reserved
for black workers violated sections 703(a) and (d) of title VI).
217 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
218 Id. at 759-64. In W.R. Grace the EEOC determined that the company had discriminated against blacks and women in hiring. While the company and EEOC were
negotiating a conciliation agreement, the collective bargaining agreement expired. The
union struck and replacements were hired. The strike was settled maintaining the old
seniority system, but female replacements were retained in higher positions than reinstated males. The reinstated male employees grieved, alleging a violation of the contract,
but the company refused to arbitrate, citing EEOC negotiations. Further, the company
sued to enjoin arbitration. A conciliation agreement was reached, and the district court
ruled that the agreement could prefer female employees, although this conflicted with
contractual seniority provisions. Next, the union appealed and before the circuit court's
decision, additional male employees were laid off under the conciliation agreement. Subsequently, the court of appeals reversed the district court and the male employees were
reinstated. These employees filed grievances for backpay. One arbitrator denied the
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ties end up losers to the extent that litigation fosters industrial
strife instead of workplace harmony.
Sometimes the union is caught between trying to correct injustices and protecting the rights of all members. For example,
in one case the union and company negotiated a plan to remedy
the exclusion of blacks through craft unionism.219 A white em-

ployee challenged the plan contending it violated sections
703(a)220 and (d) 221 of title VII. The employee relied on the spe-

cific language of these provisions, which prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race.2 22 He also cited the Court's prior holding
that title VII prohibits discrimination against blacks and
whites.223 This challenge highlighted one of the weaknesses of
title VI. 224 Even after narrowing the issue, 225 the Court was

grievances on the basis that an award of backpay would penalize the company for complying with an outstanding court order. However, a second arbitrator hearing similar
grievances granted the backpay on the basis that good faith breaches are not excepted by
the contract. In enforcing the second arbitrator's award, the Supreme Court decided that
his decision did not contravene public policy. Id. For a critical analysis of the balance
struck in W.R. Grace, see David L. Gregory, Conflict Between Seniority and Affirmative
Action Principles in Labor Arbitration, and Consequent Problems of Judicial Review,
57 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1984).
219 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 193.
220 Id. at 199-200. Section 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1992).
221 Section 703(d) further provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1992).
222 Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 ("Respondent argues that Congress intended in Title VII
to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans.").
223 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 n.8 (1976).
224 Title VII is a statute that is the product of many compromises. "Title VII could
not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both
Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators
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wrangling to come out with a
forced to engage in analytic
228
slightly persuasive result.
The Court found that its interpretation of section 703(j)1 7
and the statute's legislative history 228 supported a conclusion
that title VII does not forbid voluntary plans. 2 0 In this regard,
it noted that section 703(j) does not require racial balancing but,
at the same time, permits voluntary remedial efforts. 230 Moreover, the Court concluded that such voluntary efforts are consis-

demanded as a price for their support that 'management prerogatives, and union freedoms ... be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible'." Weber, 443 U.S. at 206
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1963)). Conceding the strength of
Weber's interpretation of the statute, the Court noted that "[riespondent's argument is
not without force." Id. at 201.
Id. at 200. In Weber the Court emphasized that it was not faced with an equal
protection issue or the question of what types of remedies a court may order under title
VII. The Court framed the issue as whether title VII forbids voluntary plans entered into
between private employers and unions that give preference to black workers.
22 Id. at 205-06 (distinguishing between what the statute "requires" and what it
"permits").
" Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-05. Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization admitted
to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1992).
" Weber, 443 U.S. at 202. In this regard, the Court noted that title VII was enacted
to remedy the historic and worsening plight of Negroes in the labor force. See also Local
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'L Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986).
22 Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06. The Court interpreted section 703(j) as prohibiting
employers from racially balancing their workforce, but as permitting them to undertake
voluntary efforts grounded in race. Id.
,13 Id. at 208. In a conclusory fashion the Court also distinguished between maintaining and eliminating racial balance as further support for its conclusion. Id. Since
voluntary plans typically include numerical hiring and promotion goals, the Court is
placed in a quandary by the reality and statutory recognition that racial imbalance,
without more, is not violative of title VIL Therefore, the extent to which those goals
actually remedy discrimination is speculative. It may be that neither litigants, scholars,
nor the Court have devised a fairer approach, which allows this less than perfect methodology to be typical.
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tent with congressional intent to leave management prerogatives

and union freedoms in place, while at the same time keeping
23 1
government out of regulating private businesses.
Some affirmative action plans have been challenged by unions with mixed results. For example, in Firefighters v. Cleveland23 2 the union, after being given several opportunities to intervene, failed to articulate a substantive objection to a plan
being negotiated by minority employees and the city of Cleve-

land.233 Ultimately, the union objected to the plan, contending it

violated section 706(g) 234 of title VII since it benefited non-vic-

tims of discrimination. 3 5 The Court was unpersuaded and up231

Id. at 206.

478 U.S. 501 (1986). In this case, the City's fire department which had a history
of discrimination was sued by black and Hispanic firefighters who alleged various discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, the firefighters alleged that the City discriminated in its written exams, seniority points system and retirement system. Settlement negotiations ensued, and the Union moved and was allowed to intervene. The
Union took the position that competence should be the criteria for promotions and that
the exams effectively assessed competence. The employees and the City agreed on a plan
to which the Union objected. Partly due to labor's objections the plan was modified,
resulting in increased overall benefits to white and minority employees. Despite this accomplishment, the Union continued to object to the plan.
233 Referencing the Union's "complaint" for intervention, the Court noted that it
made no claims or contentions against the city or minority employees. Id. at 507. Further, the Court cited the district court judge's assessment of the Union's objection which
was essentially that quotas are by nature wrong and unfair. Id. at 508.
'2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This section provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate .... No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 72000(e)-3(a) of this title.
Id.
235 Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. at 514. The Union placed heavy reliance on
the last sentence of section 706(g), interpreting "order of the court" to include orders
approving consent decrees, in addition to those resulting from litigation. Id. Citing its
decision in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986), which was handed down the same day, the Court held that non-victims may in
appropriate cases benefit from title VII relief. Id. at 515. But see Sheet Metal Workers,
478 U.S. at 514 (suggesting that only actual victims may obtain relief). In other words,
232
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held the plan.2 3
In Firefightersv. Stotts,"" however, the principle of seniority was elevated above a remedial consent decree 238 Although
use of existing seniority rules would perpetuate the city's history
of discrimination against black firefighters, the Court ruled that
only actual victims can benefit from an abrogation of seniority
rights.239 Moreover, the court noted that under certain circumstances even identified victims might have to wait for relief."'
In
24 1
Stotts the Court relied heavily on the statutory recognition

of

worker.4 2

seniority systems and their importance to the average
To further buttress its ruling, the Court utilized a broad applica-

the Court found that specific individuals may be precluded from benefiting from a plan
if they are proven non-victims. Id. To some extent, this approach conflicts with the
Court's conclusion that the purpose of title VII and affirmative action is not only to
provide "make whole" relief, but also to dismantle historical discriminatory patterns and
to prevent future discrimination. In this regard, the Court found support in Sheet Metal
Workers by ruling that the plan did not "require" that non-victims benefit. Id.
2- Firefighters,478 U.S. at 515. The Court found that voluntary compliance with
the statute is consistent with congressional goals. In addition, it ruled that although consent decrees have traditional contracts and judicial attributes, they are more akin to
voluntarily-created contractual obligations than judicially-imposed ones. Hence, section
706(g)'s reference to court orders does not encompass approval of consent decrees. Id. at
519.
.. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
= Id. at 578-80.
29 Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) and Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
210 Even when an individual shows that the discriminatory practice has had an
impact on him, he is not automatically entitled to have a non-minority employee laid off to make room for him. He may have to wait until a vacancy
occurs, and if there are non-minority employees on layoff, the Court must balance the equities in determining who is entitled to the job.
Stotts, 467 U.S. at 579 (citations and footnotes omitted).
241 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1992), provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority or merit system ...provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
242 Stotts, 467 U.S. 561.
Seniority has traditionally been, and continues to be, a matter of great concern
to American workers ....It is not idle speculation to suppose that the [clity
will be required to offer greater monetary compensation or fringe benefits in
order to attract and retain the same caliber and number of workers as it could
without offering such benefits were it completely free to implement its seniority system.
Id. at 570 n.4.
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tion of procedural rules to avoid rendering the dispute moot24
and a narrow construction of contracts244 to undermine the validity of the consent decree.
Before Stotts lower courts attempted to reconcile seniority
principles with principles of equality, producing conflicting resuits.

24 5

Since Stotts the Court has further invested in seniority

by equating it with "capital assets" of potentially greater value
than the equity in one's home.2 46 The elevation of seniority 24
to
is not new for the Court, 7

supreme industrial relations status
but the subjugation of racial equality to seniority when it operates as a competing value, tends to lead to unfortunate results. 248 Further, the Court's imposition of motive-based stan-

dards for challenging seniority systems facilitates their operation
243 Id. at 568-69. Since the laid-off white employees were reinstated one month later
and others demoted were restored to their original positions, the Court had an opportunity to avoid the case on mootness grounds. However, it found that the lower courts'
decree disregarding seniority had continuing and prospective effects and "make whole"
issues such as backpay and loss of seniority were still open. Id.
24 Instead of adopting a broad construction of contracts that incorporated notions
of intent and the spirit of the agreement, the Court took the "four corners" approach. Id.
at 574. It found that the consent decree did not provide for the abrogation of seniority
rights of white employees, therefore it could not be the basis for their displacement. Id.
at 575. The Court further noted that neither the union nor the nonminority employees
were parties to the decree. Id.
It is noteworthy that in another labor relations context, the Court found that a successor employer who did not bargain or sign a collective bargaining agreement with the
union was nonetheless bound by that agreement. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). In Wiley the Court held that "while the principles of law
governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to a
contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract." Id. at
550.
2. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977)
(requiring "actual victim" status and placing seniority over plan), rev'd, 433 U.S. 193
(1979). But see EEOC v. AT&T, 56 U.S.L.W. 2347 (N.D. IMI.1987) (preferring the plan
over seniority objections) (No. 78 C 3951, 82 C 1542), 1988 W.L. 4950 (N.D. IM., Jan. 20,
1988) (findings and conclusions responding to defendant's Statement of Unresolved Issues); Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 403 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D.
Miss. 1975) (deferring to plan designed to remedy seniority system that perpetuated the
effects of past discrimination), rev'd, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 461 U.S. 757
(1983).
"' Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1985) (quoting Richard H.
Fallon & Paul C. Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 58).
24' See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Ford Motor Company
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337
U.S. 521 (1949).
248 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 298 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (deference to the seniority
scheme would wipe out school's remedial efforts and gains).
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despite their discriminatory effects. 2 49

The Court has recently reaffirmed the primacy of seniority
as an overriding value in labor relations. 250 However, equal employment opportunity also remains a value of national importance.251 As such, the deference granted to unions to order and
manage seniority affairs as exclusive and majority representatives should not be diluted when the union is fashioning racial
affairs in pursuit of equality and industrial peace. 5 2 The collective tendency of unions can serve as a built-in headwind against
allocation of opportunities that unnecessarily trample majority
employees' interests.2 53
Overall, these challenges highlight labor unions' continuing
dilemma of responding to the needs of a majority constituency
and, at the same time, securing opportunities and protection for
disadvantaged groups. Although union decisionmaking is someTeamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 904 (1989). Lorence has been
legislatively overturned by section 112 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, but its statements on
seniority were left intact. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see Banns v. American Airlines, 969 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1992); O'Shea v. City of San Francisco, 966 F.2d 503
(9th Cir. 1992). Specifically, the Lorance Court noted that seniority enjoys special treatment in title VII and it cannot be successfully challenged without proof of discriminatory intent. Id. This proposition holds even if the seniority plan has some discriminatory
consequences. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 65, 69 (1982); Pullman Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982)). The Court reaffirmed that seniority systems are not
subject to disparate impact analysis. Id. at 906. This, in part, triggered Justice Marshall
to note in his dissent that "[i]t remains astonishing to me that seniority systems are
sheltered from disparate-impact claims." Id. at 916 n.2 (citations omitted) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). "Even the majority concedes that '[a]s an original matter ... a plausible,
and perhaps even the most natural, reading of § 703(h), regards that subsection as
merely providing an affimative defense to a disparate impact action brought under §
703(a)(2)%"' Id. (citation omitted) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
251 Title VII was passed based on the congressional determination that every person
in this country is entitled to equal employment opportunities. See Pub. L No. 95-555,
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2076. The new civil rights law also reflects the national will
on this issue.
152 California Brewers Ass'n. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980).
2-5 One contentious aspect of affirmative action plans seems to be the prospect that
non-minority employees may have to make sacrifices in furtherance of the plan. It could
be that affirmative action schemes would have greater acceptance and wider support if
they provided opportunities without concomitant burdens. However, employment rights,
like any other "right" recognized by law, flows to a limited resource-jobs. As such, competition for employment opportunities automatically attracts divergent interest groups.
This reality has provided the Court with justification to require a "tailoring" of plans
and cautionary measures to ensure that the burden on "innocent victims" is light. See
Wygant v. Jackson 3d of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-76, 281-82 (1985).
249

250 See
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times the product of Hobbesian choices for the majority representative, deficiencies in union democracy remain a contributing
factor to unequal employment opportunities.
Besides human failure in the workplace, frailties in title VII
also impede the goal of workplace harmony. Some legal challenges highlighted the tension between specific statutory mandates and statutory goals and purposes. For example, in Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC25" section 706(g)'s specific prohibition
against ordering a union to admit employees not discriminated
against was overridden by a general statement of equity in the
statute.255 Similar creativity was meted out in section 703()'s
prohibition of preferences or quotas through a distinction between remedies and requirements. 256 However, recent Court rulings have curtailed this creative direction.25
III. THE CASE FOR INCREASED ARBITRATOR, UNION AND BOARD
INVOLVEMENT

A.

The Flexibility of Arbitration

In the past the Court neatly distinguished the role of arbitrators in interpreting a contract from the role of judges when
addressing statutory claims. 25 s However, apprehensions about
2' Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).

2" Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 421. Section 706(g)(2)(A) provides: "No order
of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of
a union . . . " § 706(g)(2)(A) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5. The Court interpreted the provision for equitable relief as granting district
courts broad discretion to remedy discrimination. 478 U.S. at 446. In this case, the Court
found that persistent and egregious discrimination or its lingering effects was sufficient
to override the specific statutory prohibition in section 703(g). Id. at 445. The "persistent, egregious, or lingering" standard was subscribed to by a majority of the Court resulting in the holding that under certain circumstances, court-ordered affirmative action
may be an appropriate response to societal discrimination. Id. But see id. at 499 (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., dissenting) (affirmative action can only benefit actual victims).
256 Id. at 467, 471. Despite congressional emphasis on the "make whole" purpose of
this provision and a line of the Court's decisions affirming this proposition, the Court
ruled that section 703(j) prohibits requiring racial balancing, but is silent on affirmative
action as a remedy. Id. at 463-64.
11" See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (requiring that victims be
identified); Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 347 (1990) (affirming Croson's essential
principles while upholding the legitimacy of "diversity" as a goal).
258 In Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the Court
noted that arbitrators are confined to the interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining contract, not enacted legislation. However, an arbitrator can look to the law
for help in assessing the agreement. Later in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36,
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arbitrators' capacity to handle statutory claims were exaggerated.259 If arbitrators are capable of effectively assessing title VII
claims, the conclusion that they should do so becomes compelling. With the efficiency 60 and economy" 1 of the arbitral process, it becomes that more difficult to say no to arbitration.
The Gardner-Denverdecision triggered the proposal of various models for arbitrating title VII claims. 2 Most models
were premised on the theory that title VII rights require more
than the traditional protections afforded by the collective bargaining contract or arbitration forum. 26 3 For example, the model
used by the American Arbitration Association incorporates rules
of discovery and evidence and choice of law principles generally
absent from arbitration procedures for other labor matters.2 "
The presumption is that uniquely federal rights can only be enforced properly by adopting judicial standards of substance and

57 (1974), the Court reiterated that final responsibility for the enforcement of title VII
lies with federal courts since the arbitrator's special competence is the law of the shop,
not law of the land. Id. Further, the Court stated that arbitrators must resolve conflicts
between statutory law and the contract in favor of the contract. Id; see also Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
=9 See ELKOURi & ELKOUi, supra note 20, at 376-77
[Q]ualified observers in the field of labor law and arbitration have expressed
the belief that the requisite capability is in fact possessed by many if not most
arbitrators... the present Authors, having studied thousands of arbitration
opinions and a great many court opinions, believe that arbitrators on the whole
are capable of dealing with statutes and other external law bearing upon
problems which the parties have brought to the arbitrator. Moreover, the authors believe that this capability probably equals and sometimes exceeds that
of many courts, including some federal courts.... The capacity to comprehend
and to evaluate weighty subject matter, and to apply it to the specific case, is
the critical requirement, and here most arbitrators are qualified.
Id.
2Co Id. at 7 ("Arbitration claims among its advantages that expertise of a specialized
tribunal and the saving of time, expense, and trouble.").
261 Id. ("[T]he costly, prolonged, and technical procedures of courts are not well
adapted to the peculiar needs of labor management relations.").
212 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Integrity and Circumspection:The Labor Low Vision of BernardD. Meltzer, 53 U. CHL L. Rav. 78, 106 (1986) (discussing "expansionist"
and "limitist" proposals); Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal
Employment Disputes, 33 ARn J. No. 4, 22 (1978) (proposing a two track system for
"simple" cases and an EEOC model, but noting reservations about general use of arbitration); Robert Coulson, Fair Treatment: Voluntary Arbitration of Employee Claims, 33
AR& J. No. 3, 23 (1978) (proposing a model with greater procedural and substantive
protections).
2'6 See supra note 262.
2"

See Coulson, supra note 262, at 23-25.
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procedure. Wholesale transferral of judicial substance and procedure to the arbitral forum may not be advisable given Gilmer's
pronouncements. Although remedies have been expanded and
proof requirements have been to a large extent restored by the
new Civil Rights Act, motivation and causation requirements
still plague title VII plaintiffs.2 5 If arbitrators are governed by
these requirements, employees' chances of recovery in the arbitral forum may be reduced.
Historically, arbitrators were granted great flexibility in interpreting collective bargaining contracts, even when external
2'5 Proof of discriminatory motive remains an essential part of a title VII case. See
generally The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See also
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters the Court observed that:
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Id.at 335 n.15. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266 (1977).
Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted title VII. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (June 9, 1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("What the bill does ... is simply to make it an
illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that
men and women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as
Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. (footnote omitted). Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not
required under a disparate-impact theory.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. Compare, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430-32 (1971), with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973). See
generally BARBARA LINDEMANN ScHELI & PAuL GROSSmAN, EMPLOYMENT DisCRIMNATION
LAW 1-12 (1976); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise:Griggs v.Duke Power Co.
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). "Either
theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts." 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
The Wards Cove decision had greatly increased disparate impact plaintiffs' burden
while at the same time lowering employers' defense obligations. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text. The 1991 Act restored proof requirements outlined in Griggs but
plaintiffs must still identify each alleged wrongful practice, except in instances when the
employer's discriminating process cannot be separated into individual acts. The 1991 Act
also allows an employer to discriminate with impunity in mixed motive cases, unless
plaintiff can show that prohibited conduct was a "motivating factor" for the employer's
decision. Id.
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law was implicated. Accordingly, arbitrators had much freedom
to mold decisions that were fair, even if legally unsupported."'
This flexibility to give "equitable" relief, despite the law, potentially offers greater accommodation of employees' interests than
that afforded by judges who must apply the law. This approach
also bodes well for industrial peace since the informality, accessibility and continuity of the arbitration process all tend to reduce the acrimony and terminal attitudes associated with discrimination disputes. 67
The filing of a grievance or demand for arbitration is a routine matter in labor relations. It is generally assigned a number
and, depending on the relationship of the parties, will be finally
disposed of in a few weeks, months or years. During the pendency of the grievance, the parties continue to work with each
other. However, filing a title VII claim with an administrative
agency or court creates an atmosphere of emergency atypical of
the grievance arbitration process. Title VII lawsuits generally require prompt and effective attention, usually in the form of substantial time and financial commitment. Although relegating discrimination claims to the level of any other grievance might tend
to deprive them of their inherent force, employers and employees alike will appreciate the benefits of quick and fair relief.
Arguably, part of what makes title VII effective is the high
cost 268 and negative publicity26 " associated with such litigation.
But these factors cause great acrimony between parties and pave
2 Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (arbitrator
may consider enacted legislation, but is not governed by it). But see Harry T. Edwards,
Alternate Dispute Resolution-Panaceaor Anathema, 99 HAiv. L. Rev. 668 (1986) (suggesting that arbitrators are competent to handle discrimination cases as long as courts
articulate the law and arbitrators are confined to the law as articulated).
2'7 See Falkowski v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 470, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (title VII suits are
acrimonious and "involve disputes intensely personal in nature"); Dister v. Continental
Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988).
26 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 981 (1983) ("If quotas
and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive
litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be wvidely adopted.");
see also Romain v. Kurek, 836 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1987); Truvillion v. King's Daughter Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1980); Leroy D. Clark, The Future Of Civil Rights
Agenda: Speculation On Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATL U. L. Rv.
795, 820 (1989).
269 See Steven M. Woodside & Jan Howell Marx, Walking the Tightrope Between
Title VII and Equal Protection: Public Sector Voluntary Affirmative Action After
JOHNSON and WYGANT, 20 URBAN LAWYER No. 2, 367, 378 (1988). See also Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the way for terminal as opposed to continuing relationships. 27 0
Arbitration has the potential to accommodate the competing interests of employers and employees. Although lawsuits represent
a form of sanction that works, employers would prefer not to
spend large sums of money on litigation or face and respond to
public allegations of bias. The privacy of the arbitral process
and the limited publication of arbitration awards is also attractive to employers. Some stigmatization and deterrence associated with court hearings and reported findings of discrimination
may be lost in the arbitral forum, but the arbitrator's flexibility
in granting relief under traditional standards can help advance
the deterrence functions of antidiscrimination laws.Y
At the same time, employees want a discrimination-free
workplace, devoid of the stress, time commitment and cost associated with pursuing discrimination claims. The arbitrator's success will depend in part on the union's willingness to pursue
claims free of bias.2 72 Fair advocacy by unions coupled with "essence" standards rather than external law, could make the arbitrator an effective player in the national quest for equal employment opportunity. However, if arbitrators must be governed by
"the law" and their awards must mirror decisions of courts, the
attractiveness of arbitration to employees may be reduced
greatly. Such a requirement would convert arbitration into nothing more than litigation in a private forum. Finally, binding arbitrators to the law removes a potentially favorable countervailing balance for employees, whose statutory protection has
become compromised by changing waiver rules.

270 See Leroy D. Clark & Barbara A. Bush, Arbitrationof Employment Discrimination Claims: A Need for Statutory Reform?, 11 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 47 (1985) (arbitration is better than litigation for handling long-term human relationships).
271 In Gilmer the employee litigant recognized and honed in on the deterrence function of publicity which the Court acknowledged. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991). In response to Gilmer's contention that arbitration
will result in limited publicity because arbitrators often do not issue written opinions,
the Court responded that New York Stock Exchange rules require written awards which
are made available to the public. Id. Further, courts will continue to render ADEA decisions, thereby providing publicity. Id.
272 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (giving unions broad discretion when processing grievances); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50 (1975) (black employees found without statutory authority to deal with employer directly on principles of exclusivity and majority rule, even though union consistently
failed to advocate on their behalf).
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B. The Potential of Unions
Unions have broad discretion in ordering the affairs of their
constituents" 3 and in bilateral dealings with employers.2 74 This
discretion extends to their prioritization and advocacy of discrimination issues. 75 Unions are insulated by an accountability
standard founded on union discretion 276 and can sacrifice individual rights if the decision is not arbitrary, unreasonable or in
bad faith. 7 7 This broad majority-rule-based discretion remains
controlling, although it is ill-equipped to handle the competing
demands of 'interest groups on issues of discrimination and
remediation.
When unions function as they should, democratic self-government leads to majority rule tempered by consideration and
protection of individual contractual and legal rights.2 78 Despite
what can be regarded as inherent tension or disharmony between employees' collective and individual interests and unions'
records of majoritarian preferences, 270 compromises can be
reached.8 Individual interests or rights have not always been
subordinated to majority preferences. 281 This fact serves as a
compelling foundation for delegating some responsibility for ensuring equal employment rights to unions. Unions can help harmonize issues arising under the collective bargaining agree273 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See generally Eileen Silverstein, UnionDecisions on Collective BargainingGoals:A Proposalfor Interest Group Participation,77 MiCm. L Rzy.
1485 (1979).
27 American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1982).
17 Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50
(1975).
27 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
277 Id.
278 For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270 (1986), the
union and Board of Education negotiated a collective bargaining provision that protected
minority teachers in the event of layoffs. This provision was ratified six times by the
teachers before litigation. Id. at 299. Justice Marshall noted that the protection for minority teachers ".... was forged in the crucible of clashing interest. All of the economic
powers of the predominantly white teachers' union were brought to bear against those of
the elected Board, and the process yielded consensus." Id. at 310 (Marshall, J., denting). Justice Stevens's dissent also noted that the protection provision was the product of
collective bargaining utilizing fair procedures, agreed to by the parties, and overwhelmingly approved by the membership. Id. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
18 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
81 Id.
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ment 82s with issues arising under employment laws 8 to achieve
the overall good of industrial peace. 84 In some respects, this approach would synthesize the federal policy favoring grievance arbitration and the national policy against employment
discrimination.
Since unions control the grievance arbitration process in
collective bargaining contracts, vibrant, fair and consistent advocacy is essential to show employees that resort to courts generally is unwarranted. Besides the employee confidence such advocacy engenders, union advocacy sends a message to employers
that unions will not participate in, or acquiesce to, discriminatory schemes. Vigorous advocacy will also sensitize arbitrators to
the importance of equal opportunity in addition to industrial
peace vis-a-vis wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment.28 8 Resulting arbitration awards might be more responsive to pluralistic industrial environments than legal
dogma.

28

6

However, the affirmative action cases partly demonstrate
that total delegation of civil rights enforcement responsibilities
to unions would be naive. Experience makes a compelling case
for unions to encourage and accept increased employee participation when handling discrimination claims.

28 7

The employee,

These rights provided by collective bargaining agreements are private and contractual'in nature. Typically disputes concerning these rights are enforced through the
grievance arbitration machinery provided in the agreement that is also contractual in
nature. These rights are essentially enforced without consideration or reference to public
laws. See Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960).
283 For example, title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17
(1982), the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982), and construing court decisions.
28 One of the fundamental purposes of the NLRA is to promote industrial peace.
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954).
288 Due to its relative newness, arbitrators do not have the exposure or track record
with title VII issues as with other typical labor disputes.
286 Title VII rights are statutory mandates independent of contractual rights. The
arbitrator owes fidelity to the contract, not the law. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974) (final responsibility for the enforcement of title VII lies with federal courts). However, in some respects, arbitration is viewed as therapeutic and arbitrators may sometimes find the need to render awards that appease both parties. This is uniquely true
and to some extent workable in the industrial relations context where the parties have
ongoing relationships and the search for amicability and the avoidance of acrimony is a
sought after and laudable goal.
287 This proposal recommends employee participation as a voluntary and cooperative matter between unions and aggrieved employees. It is not a call to amend the representation provisions of the NLRA, or for labor reform generally. Abundant critique of
the NLRA and calls for reform can be found in other commentaries. See, e.g. Crain,
218
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who is the real party in interest, can serve as a check on perfunctory handling of discrimination complaints and help temper
the impact of challenges by majority interest groups opposed to
a commitment of union resources to discrimination issues.
If Gilmer ultimately means that employees delegate statutory protection by selecting a collective bargaining representative, then much more stringent standards than those used to
measure the DFR will be necessary to protect individual
rights.2 8 Given the broad discretion granted unions in fulfilling
this duty,289 there is some likelihood that other issues will be
prioritized over discrimination contentions. Even for unions attempting to gain opportunities for minorities, the desire for such
advocacy may be chilled by the acrimony and opposition that
stem from such attempts. Further, some unions might view pursuit of such claims as wasting valuable bargaining chips on
claims that bring little return to the membership generally.
C.

The Board's Potential

The Board's constricted analysis of the Civil Rights Act and
its withdrawal from the field of discrimination is not mandated
by the NLRA. Given the Act's commitment to industrial peace,
a broad construction favoring regulation of strife borne of discrimination seems warranted. 2 ° Further, the Board's fleshing
out and contextualizing of other provisions of the NLRA high-

supra note 11, at 868; Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction:
An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATm UJ REv. 1 (1988); Charles Fried, Individual and
Collective Rights in Work Relations:Reflections on the CurrentState of Labor Law and
Its Prospects,51 U. CHL L. REV. 1012 (1984); Gerald E. Rosen, LaborLaw Reform: Dead
or Alive, 57 U. Dn. J. URB. LAw 1 (1979).

One commentator concluded that protection under the DFR is inadequate and
called for an enhanced duty if unions will be the protectors of employees' NLRA rights.
See Paul Alan Levy, Deferral And the Dissident,24 MIcHL J. L. Rzronsx 479, 543 (1991).

But see Leonard Page & Daniel W. Sherrick, The NLRB's Deferral Policy and Union
Reform: A Union Perspective, 24 Mica. J. L. REFoa

647, 680-85 (1991) (arguing that

employees tend to get better representation than their casea warrant and calling for more
Board deferral to internal union processes).
'" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295

F.2d 658, 666 (6th Cir. 1961). But see Simmons v. Union News Co., 382 US. 834, 87
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (Court should have granted the petition for writ of certiorari because the union should not be allowed to negotiate away individual employees'
claims of contract breach).
210

Leiken, supra note 158, at 851-57 (advocating broad construction of the Act to

cover racial issues and citing statutory support).
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lights its flexibility when interpreting the Act. An obvious example of the Board's liberal construction of the statute was evidenced by its finding that inherently destructive employer
conduct violates section 8(a)(3). 291 This finding maintains legal

vitality although it lacks specific statutory mandates or clearly
defined standards.292 Interestingly, the Board does not view dis293 despite compelcriminatory conduct as inherently destructive,
2 94
ling evidence that it has that effect.

Interpretive flexibility was also demonstrated when the
Board found that the statute protected supervisors, even though
they were not mentioned in the Act as covered employees.295
291 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). See also NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967) (no proof of discriminatory motive necessary
when conduct is inherently destructive of employee rights despite existence of a business
reason).
129See generally NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967). See also NLRB
v. Fleetwood Trailers Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (finding violation of section 8(a)(3) when
employer failed to show business justification for decision); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278, 311-13 (1965) (no section 8(a)(3) violation when employer's intention of bringing
about settlement of labor disputes has a tendency to discourage union membership);
American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1965) (finding section 8(a)(3)
violation when employer's conduct was devoid of justification and inherently prejudicial).
292 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), aff'd sub. nom., Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Black Grievance Comm. v. NLRB, 749
F.2d 1072, 1078 n.4 (3d Cir. 1984) (remanding for Board to determine whether there is
nexus between allegations of racial discrimination and finding that black employees' section 7 rights were violated, thereby constituting an independent violation of section
8(a)(1)).
294 See United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, Farmers' Co-op Compress v. United Packinghouse Workers Interm.
Union., 396 U.S. 903 (1969) (discrimination divides workers and deters claims against
employers).
295 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1947) (defining employees for purposes of statutory coverage). The original definition of employee in the Wagner Act did not mention supervisors.
Section 152(3) of the NLRA states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter specifically
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse ....
The characteristics and authority of a supervisor are defined in 29 U.S.C. section 152
(11) (1947). It provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
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Congress subsequently legislated supervisors out of the statute,298 but the Board continues to interpret the Act as providing
protection for supervisors under certain circumstances.2" The
Board also used its broad interpretive discretion to find statutory protection for applicants, although its textual remedial authority only covers employees. This liberal construction was upheld by the Court as a proper exercise of agency discretion

adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id.
Nonetheless, the Board determined that supervisors were statutorily protected in
their organizing and bargaining activities and the Court agreed. See Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947). Using a broad construction of section 2(3), the
Board developed a line of precedent referred to as the "pattern of conduct" cases, where
it found that the Act was violated if the employer's actions against a supervisor was part
of a pattern of conduct designed to coerce employees in the exercise of section 7 rights.
See, e.g., Pioneer Drilling Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced in material part, 391
F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1968); Fairview Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. 318, enforced mem., 486
F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 27 (1974); Brothers Three Cabinets, 248
N.L.R.B. 828 (1980).
2" Congress determined that the interpretation granting protection to supervisors
was unworkable and changed the definition of employee in the 1947 amendments to specifically exclude supervisors. The amendments added the following language: "or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act,
as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1947). Although this provision divested supervisors of the
protections initially granted by the Board, they remained free to join unions under 29
U.S.C. section 164(a) (1947), another addition under the 1947 amendments. Section
164(a) provides: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor
from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject
to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors
as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective
bargaining." Id.
29 The Board finally narrowed its vision of statutory protection for supervisors in
1982 when it decided Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402 (1982), petition
denied, sub. nom., Automobile Salesmen's Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.
1983). In Parker-Robbthe Board rolled back its "'pattern of conduct'" anal sis by ruling that the proper inquiry was whether the discharge of a supervisor interfered with
employees' exercise of their section 7 rights, not whether the discharge was intended as
an intimidation tactic. 711 F.2d at 384. The Board reasoned that this analysis was compelled by the Taft Hartley amendments which specifically excluded supervisors from
statutory protection. The new "direct interference" test still allows supervisors to secure
statutory protection. Id. at 404-06. See Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 275 NI.LB. 158
(1985), enforced, 801 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1937) (Act is
violated when employer disciplines supervisor for giving testimony harmful to the employer). For a good discussion of the need to include supervisors under the Act, see
Crain, supra note 11, at 1001-21.
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designed to carry out congressional policy protecting the right to

self organization. 9 " The Board has also demonstrated its interpretive flexibility in the area of free speech.2 99
The advent of title VII, coupled with a Board currently
composed of conservative appointees, however, probably eliminates any immediate likelihood of the NLRA being construed
broadly. Further, the battles fought to enact the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 teach that enacting antidiscrimination legislation is a
very tough proposition. The restoration and fortification of title
VII will also impact the debate over whether the NLRA needs
such provisions. This leaves individual statutory protection in
the hands of Board members charged with interpreting the rules
of enforcement under the NLRA. The Board has a statutory
mandate to guard individual rights. Exercise of this mandate,
devoid of political considerations, can result in the assumption
of responsibility to scrutinize claims alleging discrimination
carefully.
Inferring statutory protection for inherently destructive
conduct created great possibilities for addressing discrimination
under the NLRA. Unfortunately, the Board has held that discrimination is not inherently destructive of section 7 rights. 00 If
one credits contentions that Board members decide cases consistent with the policies of the appointing President or Administra-

2" Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). This refusal to hire case pitted sections 2(3) and 10(c) against section 8(3). Section 2(3) defines covered employees
and this definition does not include applicants. The text of section 10(c) limits the remedial authority of the Board to granting relief to employees. However, section 8(a)(3)
makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate "in regard to hire." Since the applicants
in Phelps Dodge were refused employment because of their union affiliations, the Court
was called upon to interpret the word "hire" in section 8(3). Reading the text broadly, in
conjunction with its legislative history and the historical context of the Act, the Court
rejected the construction that hire meant wages or rights of current employees. The
Court reasoned that this construction would mutilate the statute and neutralize the remedial powers for the Board charged with carrying out broad public policies established
by Congress. Id. at 192-93. For a more recent discussion of the limited rights of applicants in the drug testing context, see Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 26 (1989).
2
Initially the Board interpreted the NLRA as providing broad limitations on employer speech that interfered with employees' free choice. This approach was rejected by
the Court in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). Congress
intervened in 1947 and amended the Act to require threats, reprisals or force in employer speech. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958). However, the Board interpreted section 8(c)
as only providing a limitation in unfair labor practice cases. See General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
00 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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tion, 3 1 the likelihood of expanded discrimination coverage
under the Act remains speculative. The Act's potential to address discrimination may therefore remain stymied.
To the extent that discrimination in employment is a labor
issue, the NLRB can play a leadership role because its expertise
and experience greatly exceeds that of the EEOC. Further, the
Board's public enforcement arm can facilitate the processing of
discrimination claims to eliminate many of the costs associated
with filing a lawsuit.30 2 Although the NLRB's function has never
been as discrimination-specific as the EEOC, it is an established
player in the quest for industrial peace and justice. Further, the
Board has pursued its mission with an eye to continuing relationships with minimal disruptions in the workplace. It therefore
facilitates a process of grievance resolution that is not terminal
but continuous and therefore more amenable to increased sensitivity and better understanding between parties.
CONCLUSION

Employees certainly need flexibility in pursuing discrimination claims. They also deserve access to resolution forums that
are effective and affordable. However, the choice of an administrative forum should not result in the marginalization of an employee's statutory rights. There is no shortage of institutional capability to handle equal employment issues. But effectuating
equality in employment is dependent on the actions of individuals who lead institutions. Many hurdles stand in the way to the
extent that: (1) courts devalue title VII rights; (2) the NLRB's
noninvolvement reflects political philosophy; (3) unions' track
records reflect majoritarian preferences; and (4) arbitrators are
constrained by existing law. Although arbitration is flexible
enough to mold "fair" solutions under the contract despite the
law, such flexibility will not exist if the arbitrator must be governed by "the law" as it is currently written in this area. Traditional essence standards are critical to allow arbitrators to mold
fair solutions that promote harmony in the workplace.

0 See Edwards, supra note 167, at 24. Judge Edwards notes that such criticism is
not unusual, but one cannot evaluate the Board on politics alone.
301 For a discussion of the enforcement advantages of the Board and the remedial
limitations of title VII, see generally Leiken, supra note 158, at 833.

